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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to protect the
privacy of the individual against unwarranted governmental intrusion by
the state.1 What an individual seeks to proclaim as private and what is
protected by the Fourth Amendment are determined by a standard of
reasonableness. 2 The exclusion of evidence of the government's
warrantless electronic surveillance of an individual in a telephone booth
on a street corner, in Katz v. United States, may now be viewed
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1. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, support by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the places to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST.

amend. IV.

2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Katz formulated the modem test of reasonable expectation of privacy under
Fourth Amendment analysis. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). His formulation of privacy
became the talisman for Fourth Amendment protection. See id. Like the majority opinion, Justice
Harlan's concurrence recognized that the Fourth Amendment protected people, not places. Katz, 389
U.S. at 351 (majority opinion); id.at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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differently in light of concerns about domestic terrorist threats. 3 The
parameters of a search proscribed by the Fourth Amendment change
over time with the evolution of society's expectations of privacy. 4 Yet,
certain constitutional values remain constant, such as the right of the
people to be secure in their homes and persons against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 5 This value is deeply rooted in the nation's
6
history.
Although originally interpreted to protect a "zone of property" and
individual security, the modern Court has viewed the Fourth Amendment
to protect one's reasonable expectation of privacy. 7 Thus, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's protection evolves
as society's view on privacy changes. One commentator concluded that
"a Fourth Amendment based upon expectation of privacy must contend

3. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (majority opinion). The Court in the Katz case overruled its prior precedent
established in the Olmstead case, which required a physical trespass of property to invoke privacy
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 353; see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
466 (1928), overruled by Katz, v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Court in Katz declared that
the electronic eavesdropping was a search requiring probable cause and a warrant even though there
was no physical intrusion of the phone booth. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 ("The Government's activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words ... constituted a 'search and seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to
achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional
significance."). What an individual seeks to proclaim as private, in this case a phone conversation in a
closed phone booth, is a constitutionally protected interest so long as it is reasonable. Id. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring). The notion of "domestic terrorist threat" will be discussed throughout this
article. Would Katz be viewed differently if the government viewed the speaker in the phone booth to
fit a terrorist profile? Some would argue the warrantless searches would then be justified. Herein,
"domestic terrorism" is defined to mean any terrorist act aimed at injuring, killing, or destroying
persons or property for political motivations which are designed to destroy American political
institutions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2006). Domestic terrorism includes acts that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws
of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2006).
4. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. Akil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 (1994)
[hereinafter Fourth Amendment First Principles]. Professor Amar argued for a return to the first
principles of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness clause. Id. He contended that a careful, simple
reading of the words illustrates that the Fourth Amendment does not require warrants or probable
cause, but only reasonable searches or seizures. Id. at 759, 761. He cited to historical evidence and
the role ofjuries in assigning civil damages for unreasonable searches. Id. at 780-81.
7. See supranote 3 and accompanying text.

2009]

CHANGING TIDES

with the changing nature of the modern society."
This raises the
question of how the law of criminal procedure is and will be affected in a
post 9/11 world. Will the interest in "national security" or security
from terrorist threats reshape constitutional rights, resurrecting, for
example, Korematsu's pernicious siren call of massive race- or national
origin-based seizure and internment during a time of war? Many changes
in criminal procedure doctrine have accompanied a perceived need for
greater or more direct enforcement of criminal laws. The increase in
"on the street" police encounters with citizens led to a new standard for
less than full-blown searches, called the Terry search. 9 Widespread usage,
sale, and importation of narcotics resulted in the courts granting greater
leeway to conduct warrantless searches and seizures. 10 Commentators
have written widely about the drug war's impact on the law of criminal
procedure and the Fourth Amendment. One commentator stated, "Like
the war on drugs before it, the war on terrorism is likely to leave us with
a different law of criminal procedure than before." 11
The "war on terror" is changing society's view on Fourth
Amendment privacy values.
The interest in protecting domestic
security has resulted in increased acceptance of airport searches of
persons and property, mass video surveillance on public thoroughfares,
and warrantless searches of citizens in public buildings, stadiums, office
buildings, trains, subways, buses, schools, public institutions, and private
workplaces. 12 To what extent will the American public and courts
believe that privacy and security are or should be subject to greater
restrictions for some greater good? Is balancing privacy interests against
security the proper framework to safeguard Fourth Amendment
interests?13
Terrorist bombings in July 2005 on public transportation systems in
Madrid, Spain and London, England heightened public awareness and

8. Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman" 's FourthAmendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government
and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1758 (1994). Sundby asserted that the Fourth Amendment as a
privacy- focused doctrine has not fared well in modem times and no longer fully captures the values
at stake. Id. His article re-examined the privacy-based doctrine of the Fourth Amendment and argues
for a reciprocal government-citizen trust. Id. at 1771-1808; see infra note 81.
9. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
10. William J. Stuntz, Local PolicingAfter the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137,2151 (2002).
11. Id. at 2160.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL

EMERGENCY 31 (2006). Posner argued for a balancing approach to the threat of terrorism, evaluating
liberty interests in freedom from government restraint against the interest in with public safety. Id. He
suggested that some constitutional rights change as the relative weights of interest in liberty and safety
change. Id.
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concerns for safety. 14 The American public reacted to the London
bombings with some skepticism, anxiety, and an overall concern for
greater security.15 Although there were no immediate known "terrorist
threats" following the 2005 London bombings, municipal officials in
New York and Washington, D.C. claimed that security of public places
could be assured by employing heavily armed policemen on subway
stations and increasing video surveillance. 16 Without any basis of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, New York City immediately
initiated mass searches of baggage, luggage, and personal belongings of
persons using the subway system.17 Similarly, in Washington, D.C,
former Mayor Anthony Williams claimed that the greater use of video
camera surveillance of neighborhoods, recreation facilities, parks, and
commercial areas following the 2005 bombings would not be a "big
mortal threat to civil liberties."18
The tide immediately shifted from a reasonable expectation of
privacy in one's bags and personal effects to a heightened sense of
insecurity without any perceived threat of terrorist violence. There
were no major terrorist strikes on American soil since 9/11 to prompt
New York City to undertake suspicionless searches of subways.
Authorities later determined that the London bombings were a product
of a locally grown terror group in London. 19 Yet, public opinion polls
taken immediately following the London bombings showed that
Americans overwhelmingly favored the checking of bags and persons
upon entering mass transit cars. 20 Expectations of privacy changed
overnight. Transit officials in Washington, D.C. announced they were

14. See Glenn Frankel, Man Shot Dead by British Police Was Innocent Brazilian Citizen; Bystander
Mistaken for Suspect in Failed Bomb Attacks, WASH. POST, July 24, 2005, at A24. The anxiety and
reaction were extraordinarily high in London following the bombings, and British police overreacted
after another failed subway bombing by chasing and eventually shooting and killing an innocent
bystander. Id. The killings produced outrage through London and the rest of the world. Id.
15. CNN.com, Your E-Mails: London Bombings, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/
07/07/feedback.london/index.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
16. See CNN.com, Cities' Security Measures, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/07/07/cities.security/
index.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
17. Michelle Garcia, New York Police Sued Over Subway Searches, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2005, at A3.
18. Eric M. Weiss, D.C. Might Add Camerasfor Police; London Bombings Renew Debate, WASH.
POST, July 14, 2005, at B1. Williams proposed to enlarge the use of video cameras beyond the
guidelines approved by the D.C Council. Id. Council guidelines allowed cameras to be used only to
monitor traffic, large demonstrations, and city emergencies and required installation only in areas
"where people would have a reasonable expectation of being videotaped." Id.
19. Sam Knight, Profile: The Leeds Bombers, TIMESONLINE (London), July 13, 2005,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article543476.ece (last visited Jan. 5,2010).
20. David W. Moore, London TerroristAttack Increases Worries Among Americans, Gallup News
Service, July 8, 2005, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/1722 1/london-terrorist-attack-increasesworries-among-americans.aspx.

2009]

CHANGING TIDES

considering random searches of trains. 21 Members of the United States
House of Representatives immediately passed a bill, after lengthy debate,
extending the Patriot Act. 22 These actions were labeled as necessary
counterterrorism measures. Undoubtedly, such measures may also lead
to abuse, such as racial or ethnic profiling or unguided discretion by the
individual conducting the search. Where will the public, and hence the
Court, be willing to draw the constitutional boundary between individual
privacy and counterterrorism measures?
Will warrantless or
suspicionless searches of persons or cars on the public streets, or
warrantless entries in the home, schools, churches, synagogues, and
places of worship be accepted as needed for domestic security increases?
As the public's privacy expectations change, so will the Courts'
expectations .23
In New York, passengers ultimately filed a lawsuit challenging the
random container searches on subways as unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment. 24 In MacWade v. Kelly, the Second Circuit, relying
on the special needs doctrine, upheld the warrantless and suspicionless
searches as constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 25 Initially
premised on a reduced expectation of privacy in certain areas as
justification for warrantless searches without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, 26 the special needs doctrine is expanding to cover
random counterterrorism searches in the war on terror. 27 How then
should the courts look at what is a reasonable expectation of privacy in
light of worldwide terrorist threats? The Eleventh Circuit recently
asserted that we cannot restrict civil liberties until the war on terror is
2
over because the war on terror may never be over. 1
The government has expanded the warrantless wiretapping and
datavellaince in the name of national security and has, thus, affected the
privacy interests of thousands of Americans. The National Securities
Administration's Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP"), a program

21. Paul Duggan & Lyndsey Layton, Transit Security Seen and Unseen; Most Commuters Not Riding
Scared, WASH. POST, July 14,2005, at Al.
22. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Postponing Debate, Congress Extends Terror Law 5 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 23, 2005, at Al.
23. See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
24. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 263-66 (2d Cir. 2006).
25. Id. at 275; see infra Part IIIF.

26. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
27. See, e.g., Mac Wade, 460 F.3d at 275.

28. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1307, 1312, 1325 (11th Cir. 2004) (invalidating the City of
Columbus' policy of conducting check point magnetometer searches of persons wishing to protest

outside the Fort Benning military base).
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authorizing secret, warrantless surveillance of international telephone
and email communications between persons in the United States and
persons abroad suspected of being members of or affiliated with al Qaeda,
created widespread controversy because of its secrecy and deliberate
bypassing of constitutional and statutory safeguards. 29 The program was
established by secret presidential executive order.3"
Congress later
amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to exercise oversight
over the program and issued subpoenas seeking information concerning
the program's secret authorization by the president. 31
Recent
revelations that domestic email communications between American
32
citizens were also secretly collected have raised even more concerns.
Moreover, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") challenged the
TSP, and a federal district court issued a partial summary judgment
against the program's operation. 33 That decision was later reversed by
the Sixth Circuit on standing grounds, but nevertheless, the court stated
that "the TSP was unlawful.

'34

In sum, the Court has in recent years balanced the degree of
government intrusion of the individual or place searched against the

government's need for the search.

This article addresses some of the

questions posed by the evolution of the Fourth Amendment doctrine in
light of terrorist concerns since 9/11. Part II will address the history of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, from the Boyd Era of property

protection and the use of general warrants to discover evidence of crime,
to Olmstead and the development of the right of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment. Part III will address the modern test under Katz and
the current search and seizure doctrine, including Terry stops; racial,

29. The program was first discovered by reporters of the New York Times who withheld publication
of the story. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets US. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec.16, 2005, at Al. The TSP was later revealed by the Bush Administration. President George W.
Bush, President's Radio Address (Dec. 17, 2005), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html [hereinafter Radio Address]; Press
Release, Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen. and Gen. Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Dir. For Nat'l
Intelligence
(Dec.
19,
2005),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.
gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html [hereinafter Press Release].
30. See Press Release, supranote 29.
31. USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192
(2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); RONALD B. STANDLER, GEORGE BUSH'S
ILLEGAL TERRORIST
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM-QUOTATIONS
AND LINES 44-53 (2007),
http://www.rbsO.com/TSP.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
32. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Extent of E-Mail SurveillanceRenews Concerns in Congress,N.Y.
TIMEs, June 17, 2009, at Al.
33. ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev 'd, 493 F.3d
644 (6th Cir. 2007).
34. ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 720 (6th Cir. 2007).
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ethnic, and terrorist profiles; airport and border searches; roadblocks;
and mass video and data surveillance. Part IV will discuss the recent
assaults on privacy interests under the expectation of privacy test and
address the need to balance liberty and privacy concerns under the
Fourth Amendment with the need for domestic homeland security. Part
V will explore whether the current Katz standard of reasonable
expectations of privacy is sufficient under changing circumstances of the
war on terror or whether the special needs doctrine or a domestic
security exception to the Fourth Amendment's test of reasonableness
should govern under society's changing expectations with respect to
privacy and security.

II.

EARLY HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

In the context of perceived terrorist threats to national security and
the technology for ever greater scrutiny of individuals, changes in the
Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine appear to be eroding the traditional
protections of individuals. How has our concept of Fourth Amendment
protection of privacy from government intrusion changed in the
context of modern law enforcement and counterterrorism measures in
the twenty-first century?
The expansion of the internet, email
communication, omnipresent cell phones, thermal image devices,
biometric imaging, whole body imaging, mass video surveillance, and
mass data surveillance as measures in law enforcement or
counterterrorism have presented new challenges to privacy concepts
under the Fourth Amendment. 35 For over two centuries, protecting the
individual citizen from overbroad, unwarranted governmental intrusion
has been a central meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 36 At times, it
has been a delicate balance of security and liberty-an expansion of
governmental powers during times of national emergencies, followed by
judicial deference and retrenchment by the courts. 37 Some would say

35. Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: BalancingNational Security with Privacy Under the USA
PATRIOTAct, 80 DENY. U. L. REV. 375, 376 (2002). The author noted, "Today's technology has the
potential to eliminate the area in which an individual can legitimately declare privacy from the
intrusion of the government. If allowed to do so, the very fabric of our democratic society will
change." Id. Whole body imaging is a device used by airport security officials to photograph air
travelers through a millimeter wave scanner, producing a virtual, naked image of an individual.
Jessica Ravitz, Airport Security Bares All, or Does I?, CNN.cOM, May 18, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TRAVEL/05/18/airport.security.body.scans/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2010). The
images are shown on a screen in a separate, closed room, and the traveler's face is not identified with
the image. Id.
36. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
37. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE
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there is an inherent check and balance in the constitutional system that
restores the balance in favor of liberty after the threat has passed. 38 In
the case of the growing threat of international terrorism since 9/11, the
war in Iraq, and the expansion of the war in Afghanistan, there appears
to be no ending point where constitutional boundaries can be relaxed to
restore any imbalance in the personal liberty, privacy, and security
paradigm. The nature of constitutional law changes with changes in
threats to security and liberty. Yet, the commands of the Fourth
Amendment seem equally clear-the protection from the government
against unreasonable searches and seizures of a person's house, papers,
and effects. 39 A historical overview of Fourth Amendment doctrine
demonstrates how courts have interpreted the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment principles to protect against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
40
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The Fourth Amendment has drawn its historical meaning from the
common law and the English case of Entick v. Carrington, which
addressed the widespread abuses of the general warrants and the writs of
assistance. 41 In Entick, the Secretary of State issued general executive

COURTS 16 (2007). The authors argued for a trade-off thesis between security and liberty and a
deference thesis where judges and legislators should defer to governmental balancing during times of
emergencies. Id. at 15. For example, if domestic security is at risk, then intrusive searches should be
tolerated. See id. at 16. This view would lead to a relaxing of the Fourth Amendment during times of
emergencies. See id. It would then be permissible under the Patriot Act for executive officials to
inspect records and books of patrons at libraries and bookstores. Id. at 22.
38. Id. at 42-43; see also POSNER, supra note 13, at 44 ("Every time civil liberties have been curtailed
in response to a national emergency, whether real or imagined, they have been fully restored when
the emergency passed-and before it passed, often long before.").
39. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
40. Id.
41. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817-18 (K.B.). Writs of Assistance were like
general warrants. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 28 (1970). The abuse of the general warrants
and writs of assistance by the English government led to the ratification of the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S 297, 327 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); LASSON, supra note 41, at 50 & n.125. The writs had been used by customs agents to
detect the smuggling of illegal goods by the colonists. Id. at 51. In 1761, all writs expired six months
after the death of George II, and the colonists petitioned the court, opposing any new writs. Id. at 57-
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warrants authorizing local officials to roam about and seize libelous
material and libellants of the sovereign. 42 Entick, a victim of the
searches, brought a successful damage action against the crown. 43 Lord
Camden, in affirming the judgment, wrote that if such sweeping tactics
were validated "the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in the
kingdom will be thrown open to the search and inspection of a
messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall think fit to charge, or
even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of
seditious libel."'44 The abuses of the general warrant by the crown and
unchecked governmental power were among the principal reasons the
45
framers adopted the Fourth Amendment.
In Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in addressing the constitutionality of telephone wiretaps under the
Fourth Amendment, acknowledged, "The well known historical purpose
of the Fourth Amendment, directed against general warrants and writs of
assistance, was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a
man's house, his person, his papers and his effects, and to prevent their
seizure against his will."' 46 In this case, the government wiretapped the
defendant's telephone line to disclose a conspiracy to import alcohol,
and the Court stated, "The language of the [Fourth] Amendment can
not [sic] be extended and expanded to include telephone wires reaching
to the whole world from the defendant's house or office.
The
intervening wires are not part of his house or office any more than the
highways along which they are stretched. '47 Precedent established that
the Fourth Amendment was only violated by "an official search and
seizure of his person, or such a seizures of his papers or his tangible
material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house 'or
curtilage'...." ' 48 Although wiretaps were placed in the basement of
Olmstead's office building and near his home, there was no physical
trespass. 49 Thus, the Court held that the wiretapping "did not amount
to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"

58.
42. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 808.

43. Id. at 807,811.
44. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1063 (K.B.).
45. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928), overruledby Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967).

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

463.
465.
466.
457.
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and affirmed his conviction.50 The Olmstead Court effectively required
physical trespass of person or property to trigger Fourth Amendment
protection, thus creating the trespass doctrine.51
Justice Brandeis, in a famous dissent in Olmstead, disagreed with the
property-based theory of the Fourth Amendment and declared that the
Amendment was much "broader in scope" than protection of material
52
things and places alone.
The makers of our Constitution... sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever means employed, must be deemed a
53
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Brandeis' conception of a privacy right embodied in the
Fourth Amendment severed the literal construction of the Fourth
Amendment from its textual base. He noted that the Court had "time
and again... refused to place an unduly literal construction" on the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.5 4 He thought it was immaterial
where the physical connection with the telephone wires leading into the
basement was made or that the intrusion was made with the aid of law
enforcement. 55 Brandeis saw a greater future evil in the government's
use of wiretapping: "[t]he evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the
telephone is far greater than that involved in tampering with the mails
....
As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are
but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared to wiretapping. '56 Despite the brilliance of Brandeis' dissent, Olmstead
remained the law for nearly forty years until the Katz Court finally lifted
the Fourth Amendment from its property-based moorings.

50. Id. at 466, 470.
51. See id. at465-66.
52. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
53. Id. Brandeis first outlined his conception of a "right of privacy" in a law review article written
with Samuel Warren. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890). Warren and Brandeis argued that privacy went beyond protecting physical
property. Id.at 205-06.
54. Id. at 476 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
55. Id.at 475.
56. Id. at 477.
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III. MODERN FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Shifting to Katz and the Right to Be Left Alone
The modern conception of the Fourth Amendment as protecting
privacy interests emerged from the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v.
United States.57 Like Olmstead, Katz involved government wiretapping
of defendant Katz's telephone conversations in a public telephone
booth. 58 The government argued there was no physical trespass in the
wiretapping since it was outside the phone booth, and therefore, the
Fourth Amendment and its warrant clause were inapplicable under
Olmstead's trespass doctrine. 59
In overruling Olmstead's trespass
doctrine, the Court noted that the underpinnings of the trespass doctrine
were no longer controlling. 60
The fact that the electronic device
employed by the government did not penetrate the wall of the booth
had no constitutional significance. 61 The Court held:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
62
be constitutionally protected.
The Court noted that what Katz wanted to exclude by entering the
phone booth was not the intruding eye but "the uninvited ear" of the
government listening in on the conversations without a judicially
authorized warrant. 63 A person is entitled to keep his conversations
from being broadcasted to the world. 64 The Court also rejected the
government's contention that the narrowness of the search, only
listening to certain conversations, excused the requirement for a
warrant. 65 "Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will

57. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967); id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 348 (majority opinion).
59. Id. at 352-53.
The government also argued that a public telephone booth was not a
constitutionally protected area, but even if it was, a physical penetration of the phone both was
necessary for a search to occur. Id. at 351-52.
60. Id. at 353.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 351-52 (internal citations omitted).
63. Id. at 352.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 354-56.
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remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The government
agents here ignored 'the procedure of antecedent justification... that is
central to the Fourth Amendment,"'' 66 in this case a judicially authorized
warrant.
The Court in Katz took an important step and recognized privacy as a
central meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but not the only principle.
Justice Harlan's concurrence laid out the more fundamental test that has
emerged as the sine qua non of the search doctrine-"the right to be let
alone. ' 67 Justice Harlan's two-part test requires, "first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."' 68 The reasonable expectation of privacy formulation has
been the "loadstar" for determining how and when the Fourth
Amendment should be applied. 69 The concept of privacy, thus, emerged
as the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment.70 The privacy
concept also determined what constituted a search subject to the
commands of the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause and its
prohibition against unreasonable searches.7 1 If government action does
not invade some justifiable expectation of privacy that society regards
as reasonable, then it is not deemed a search under the Fourth
72
Amendment's warrant clause or reasonableness clause.
While the Katz Court defined what constituted a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes, it did not define privacy interests. 73 Matters
exposed to the public view such as garbage left at the curbside of one's
home or information generally given to third parties, such as bugged
informants, phone records, pen registers, or bank records, are not
searches governed by the warrant requirement. 74 Crops left growing in
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 359 (quoting Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966)).
Id. at 350; see id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
Sundby, supranote 8, 1756.
Id.
Id. at 1756-57.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

73. RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 356 (2d ed. 2005); Ronald J.

Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General
Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1149,1159-60 (1998); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 382-83 (1974) (suggesting that the
legitimate expectation of privacy test had replaced one "talismanic solution" for Fourth Amendment
problems with another).
74. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (finding that a person does not
have a reasonable subjective expectation in privacy and that society is not willing to recognize an
expectation of privacy in garage left for pick up on the road); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745
(1979) (holding there is no search if the police discover numbers dialed from the telephone company

2009]

CHANGING TIDES

open fields and observations made through partially open roof tops,
windows, or doors are not deemed searches subject to the Fourth
Amendment. 75 Privacy was thus viewed as an aspect of secrecy; if it is
observable from a lawful vantage point, then it is not private. 76 The
Fourth Amendment as a concept of privacy embodying secrecy has
undergone scholarly criticism, 77 as did the old Olmstead trespass

doctrine. 78 As one commentator suggested, "Although we have moved
from the Boyd and Olmstead world of physical papers and places to a
new regime based upon expectations of privacy, there is a new
'79
Olmstead, one that is shortsighted and rigid in approach.
Criticism directed at the concept of secrecy is embedded in the
modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of privacy. "Many current
problems in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence stem from the Court's
failure to conceptualize privacy adequately, both in method and
substance." 80 Some commentators have argued, for example, that
privacy should be viewed as an abstract value or principle protected by
the Fourth Amendment rather than as a fact-specific inquiry to
determine if the Fourth Amendment should apply to a governmental
intrusion. 81 Some of the cases, for example, have focused on the

because the customer voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the phone company); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441, 445 (1976) (holding that a person has no reasonable expectation of
privacy concerning information kept in bank records because that information was voluntarily given to
third parties). The Miller decision has been criticized as highly questionable in its privacy analysis.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 144 (3d ed. 2000). The fact that customers turn

over checks and deposits to banks as third parties does not indicate a lack of privacy interest by the
customer. Id.
75. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (plurality opinion); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 180-81 (1984).
76. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1105 (2002) [hereinafter
ConceptualizingPrivacy].
77. See, e.g., id. at 1109. Solove examined the various conceptions of privacy under various
categories such as right to be left alone, secrecy, intimacy, control over personal information, and
personhood. Id. at 1092. He argued it was a mistake to invoke a common denominator to define all
privacy interests. Id. For example, he asserted that a number of theorists have claimed that
understanding privacy as secrecy conceptualizes privacy too narrowly. Id. at 1108. Privacy,
according to Solove, does not have universal value but must be looked at from particular practices and
the social value of those practices. Id. at 1093.
78. See supranotes 52-56 and accompanying text.
79. Daniel J. Solove, DigitalDossiers and the Dissipation of FourthAmendment Privacy, 75 S.CAL. L.
REV. 1083, 1133 (2002) [hereinafter Dissipation of FourthAmendment Privacy]. Solove argued that
we have moved to a new Olmstead due to the Court's emphasis on secrecy. Id. "This conception of
privacy is not responsive to life in the modern Information Age, where most personal formation exists
in record systems of hundreds of entities." Id. at 1087.
80. Id. at 1122.
81. Sundby, supra note 8, at 1760. Sundby concluded, "When used as a factual measure, reliance
upon privacy as the centerpiece of Fourth Amendment rights actually creates the potential for less
overall protection." Id. Thus, the Court should ask whether bank or phone records should be kept
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frequency of helicopter aerial surveillance four hundred feet above one's
home,8 2 collecting urine samples,8 3 dog sniffing of cars and trucks on
public highways, 8 4 manipulation of luggage and handbags,85 or the
physical distance between a barn and house.8 6 Therefore, the traditional
cases have measured reasonable expectations of privacy from a factual
matter rather than as constitutional values.
In light of technological advances and the government's professed
need for domestic security, what constitutional values should the Fourth
Amendment protect beyond the physical right to be left alone? Some
have argued that the privacy doctrine has led to a decline of Fourth
Amendment protection.87 They contend that it is a non-workable
framework for protecting Fourth Amendment rights.88 As people's
expectations change, the law itself must adapt to changing
circumstances. The extent to which the war on terror has changed
individual expectations of privacy will be discussed more fully below.
B. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures and the Fourth Amendment's
Warrant Clause
In addition to protecting one's reasonable expectation of privacy
against unwarranted government intrusion, the Fourth Amendment, by
its literal terms, protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects .... ,,89 The Fourth Amendment's
second clause requires that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or thing to be seized." 90
Historically, the framers of the Fourth Amendment were concerned

private, invoking privacy as a value, rather than ask whether, as a factual matter, we expect others to
see those records. Id. at 1760-61. Sundby advocated for the constitutional value of trust between the
government and the citizenry. Id. at 1777.
82. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (plurality opinion).
83. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626-27 (1989).
84. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005).
85. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000).
86. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1987) (holding that a barn located sixty yards from
the house and fifty yards from the fence surrounding the house was outside the curtilage and not
subject to protection).
87. ConceptualizingPrivacy, supranote 76, at 1108; Sundby, supranote 8, at 1760.
88. Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, supra note 79; Christian M. Halliburton, How Privacy
Killed Katz: A Tale of Cognitive Freedom and the Property of Personhoodas Forth Amendment Norm,
42 AKRON L. REV. 803, 827 (2009).
89. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
90. Id.
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about the abuses of the English general writs of assistance, which allowed
government officials to indiscriminately seize a person's private papers
in their homes. 91 In Britain, many of the writs of assistance were issued
against critics of the Crown, and the government sought to gather
information to suppress political speech. 92 The early English cases of
Wilkes v. Wood and Entick v. Carrington involved the issuances of writs
of assistance by the Crown to search and seize incriminating papers of
government critics without proper judicial limitations protecting an
individual's right to privacy. 93 Thus, the requirement of a judicially
authorized warrant under the Fourth Amendment would protect privacy
interests as well as operate as a shield against government intrusion. 94 In
interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court had linked the
reasonableness clause and the warrants clause together and defined the
reasonableness of a search or seizure by whether it had complied with the
warrant requirement. 95 As the Court stated in Katz, "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or
''96
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The warrant clause was the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment
requirement of probable cause. It equally applied to arrest warrants as to
search warrants. 97 For much of the Fourth Amendment's history, the
judicial preference for a warrant guided the Court's jurisprudence,
including a preference for arrest and search warrants based upon an
independent finding of probable cause by a detached and neutral
magistrate. 98 The warrant clause and its requirement of probable cause
was the cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment.9 9 Some scholars have
interpreted the historical evidence to suggest that the Fourth

91. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547, 657-

58 (1999); supranote 45 and accompanying text.
92. See Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 & n.34 (1994).

93. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 489-90 (K.B.); Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng.
Rep. 807, 807-08 (K.B.).
94. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1180 (1991)
[hereinafter The Bill of Rights as a Constitution]. Scholars have also argued that the main point of the
warrant requirement is to insulate officials from civil liability for exceeding the warrant. Id. at 1179.
Searches and seizures conducted without warrants subjected officials to civil liability and false arrest.
FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples,supranote 6.
95. The Bill ofRights as a Constitution,supra note 94, at 1178-80.

96. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
97. LAFAVE ET AL., supranote 74, at 147.
98. Id.

99. Id. at 146. As Professor LaFave stated, "The Supreme Court has long expressed a strong
preference for the use of arrest warrants and search warrants." Id. at 147; see also Silas
Wasserstorm, The Incredible Shrinking FourthAmendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 281 (1984).
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Amendment did not prohibit all warrantless searches.100 The Court later
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to permit warrantless arrests of
persons for felonies in public places.10 1 Yet, the warrantless felony
arrest did not extend to a person's home, where the Court viewed the
102
warrant requirement as sacrosanct.
To what extent did the founders anticipate that the warrant clause
would not extend to searches or arrests conducted for national or
domestic security during the present climate of widespread surveillance?
The Fourth Amendment on its face contains no such exception, despite
the new republic's newfound freedom from the occupation by troops of
the British Crown during times of war. In fact, the evidence suggests
that the Fourth Amendment itself was adopted in response to the
occupation of homes by British troops and the fears of the general
warrant. 103 Certainly, the threat of British spies, saboteurs, and foreign
agents and general searches were on the minds of the Founding Fathers
when drafting the Constitution and balancing concerns of liberty and
104
security of the nation. They struck the balance in favor of liberty.
Some scholars have recently suggested that the framers intended the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness clause, and not the warrants clause,
to govern in cases of searches in the interest of national or domestic
security. 105 Over the years, judicially crafted exceptions to the warrant
clause, such as exigent circumstances, plain view, and hot pursuit, began
to weaken the warrant clause. 106 The modern view of the Fourth
Amendment bifurcates the warrant clause and the reasonableness
clause.107 This fits squarely within the doctrine that the reasonableness

100. See, e.g., FourthAmendment Principles,supranote 6, at 759, 761.
101. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,423-24 (1976).
102. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
103. See supra note 91 and accompanying text; see also Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Katz and the
War on Terrorism, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1219, 1234 (2008). Nonetheless, Sulmasy and Yoo
suggested that the Founding Fathers would allow reasonable searches against foreign threats to
national security under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness clause. Id.
104. Benjamin Franklin stated, "Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety."
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 199 (1997).
105. Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 103, at 1219. The authors argued that by the inclusion of the
reasonableness clause, the framers understood the need for searches and seizures in the absence of a
warrant. Id. at 1235. They also concluded that there was no evidence that the Fourth Amendment
was meant to apply to national security. Id. at 1234.
106. See id. at 1224.
107. Professor Amar suggested that the modem Court has reversed the original linkage between the
Fourth Amendment's two clauses. The Bill ofRights as a Constitution,supra note 94, at 1178-80. "It is
not that a search or seizure without a warrant was presumptively unreasonable, as the Court has
assumed; rather, a search or seizure with a warrant was presumed reasonable as a matter of law-and
thus immune from jury oversight." Id. (emphasis in original).
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clause governs most searches, with the exceptions being the governing
rule. Thus, the government's need to conduct warrantless searches has
expanded over time, and the Court has taken the path of balancing the
government's justifications for the search against the individual's
privacy interest. The Katz regime of reasonable expectations of privacy
began to give way to the government's interest in conducting searches
under a variety of contexts for crime control, administrative searches,
airports, and border patrols. 10 8 The emerging question is whether the
Katz expectation of privacy test and the warrants clause will withstand
the present regime of reasonable searches for national and domestic
security.
C. Less than Probable Cause: The Dominant Reasonableness Clause and
Terry-Type Suspicion
The government's interest in conducting warrantless searches during
the present age of terror for a variety of reasons, including national or
domestic security, may likely find support among the Supreme Court
cases relaxing the probable clause standard for administrative searches
and special needs. Aside from exigent circumstances, the Supreme Court
first upheld searches without probable cause in cases where the
government asserted the need for administrative searches. Beginning
with Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, the Court began to
invite a balancing analysis in assessing Fourth Amendment interests of
reasonable expectations of privacy.10 9
The Camara Court held that housing inspections conducted in San
Francisco without a warrant triggered Fourth Amendment protection;
however, the searches could be upheld under the Fourth Amendment
because "it is obvious that 'probable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect
must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an areas inspection are satisfied.... ' 110 The Court stated that
reasonableness, not probable cause, was the ultimate standard under the
Fourth Amendment. 1
To determine the reasonableness of the housing
inspection search, the Court balanced "the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails." 112 When balancing the need to
search, the Court looked to the long history of judicial and public

108. See infra Part III.C-F.

109.
110.
111.
112.

Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
Id. at 534, 538.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 537.
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acceptance of housing inspections, whether the practice was essential to
achieving results, and whether the practice involved a relatively limited
invasion of privacy.113 Regarding the nature of the privacy interest, the
Court found that the privacy interests were minimal "because the
inspections [were] neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery
of evidence of crime ....
,,114 The searches were aimed at housing code
violations of fire, plumbing, heating, or electrical equipment rather than
personal papers.1 15 Notably, they did not involve the searches of
1 16
persons on the property, yet the privacy interests remained.
The Court's decision in Camara marked a turning point for
emphasizing the reasonableness of the search over the probable cause
standard and for balancing governmental interests against the nature of
the privacy interests at stake.117 It was also a turning point away from
the factual analysis and individual-based probable cause requirement of
the warrant clause onto a slippery slope of reasonableness in weighing
policy factors. 118 Commentators have noted that Camara marked the
emergence of the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment as the
basis for justification for searches, rather than probable cause-based
warrants.119 It later formed the basis for the Terry "stop and frisk"
doctrine and the diminished probable cause requirement for searches
120
conducted without warrants.
D. The Terry-Type Balancing and the Modern Reasonableness Test
Camara's balancing test opened the door to the acceptance of
infringement on privacy interests when the government need to conduct
searches on less than probable cause outweighed those privacy interests.
The government's justifications for administrative searches broadened
to include the need to further law enforcement in general and a wide
variety of articulated specific needs, such as Terry-type searches,
inventory searches, border searches, special needs roadblocks, and

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id.
at 535.
116. Id. at 535,537.
117. Id. at 536-39.
118. See id. at 537.
119. LAFAVE ET AL., supranote 74, at 229-30; Sundby, supranote 8, at 1767-68 ("[O]nce the express
weighing of government and privacy interests had found a foothold in the Warrant Clause for socalled administrative searches as in Camara,it was only a matter of time before the 'reasonableness'
balancing test would be applied to a variety of searches under the Reasonableness Clause as well.").
120. LAFAVE ET AL., supranote 74, at 229.
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warrantless searches in the name of national security (i.e., wiretapping
under the terrorist surveillance program). 12 1 In the wake of 9/11, the
growing acceptance of warrantless searches on less than probable cause
or even reasonable suspicion is a direct off shoot of the Court's
interpretation of the reasonableness clause under Camara and Terry v.
Ohio. 122 In response to the government's interest in combating crime
in the streets, the Court engaged in a balancing approach, balancing
liberty and privacy on one hand with the government's articulated need
for the search or seizure on the other. 123 Thus, privacy standing alone
as the principle of the Fourth Amendment is subject to a balancing of
interests and costs effectiveness. Society's expectations, then, are
subject to a scale of changing expectations.
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court upheld the police practice of a brief search
and seizure of individuals stopped based on observations about suspected
criminal activity. 124 The Court viewed restraining a person on the street
based on suspected criminal activity as a limited seizure under the Fourth
Amendment and the search of outer clothing based on fears that the
suspect was armed or dangerous as a limited pat-down search for
weapons. 125 In assessing the reasonableness of the police officers
actions in Terry, the Court said it was important to focus on the
governmental interests that justified the official intrusion upon
constitutionally protected interests of the private citizens; it was
important to balance the need for the search against the privacy interest
of the defendant. 126 The Court held that in some circumstances it was
appropriate for a police officer to approach a person in order to
investigate criminal activity without probable cause for arrest and in
some circumstances it was appropriate for the police officer to conduct
a limited search of that person's outer clothing.1 27 Under Terry not all
seizures under the Fourth Amendment are arrests, nor are all searches
full searches requiring probable cause and a warrant.1 28 The pat-down
searches were viewed as acceptable, limited intrusions of privacy
interests for Fourth Amendment purposes in light of the government's

121. See, e.g., Kathryn R. Urboyna, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme

Court's Multiple DiscoursePaths,40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1387, 1392 (2003).
122. See supraPartII.C; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
123. Id. at 22-27.
124. Id. at 30.
125. Id. at 19.
126. Id. at 22-27.
127. Id. at 25, 27.

128. See id.
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129
demonstrated need for crime prevention, detection, and safety.

The Court relied on Camara's balancing test and emphasis on
reasonableness to approve the pat-down search on less than probable
cause.1 30
The Court cited Camara when stating the appropriate
balancing test under the Fourth Amendment. 131 Thus, the Terry "stop
and frisk" was viewed as a tool to assist law enforcement officers on the
street in combating crime.132 In upholding the pat-down, the Court said,
"[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons... where [the officer] has reason to believe that he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual regardless of whether he
' 133
has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.
The Terry decision was based on the need to assist law enforcement
with on the street encounters in investigating crime and is an example of
changing circumstances.1 34 At the time, increased crime, the growth of
drug trafficking, and aircraft hijacking all impacted the Fourth
Amendment doctrine and led to the Court's expansion of searches under
the Terry doctrine. 135 Several cases involving Terry-type stops for
suspected drug activity in airports or on buses have established that
consensual police-citizen encounters do not invoke Fourth Amendment
protections.1 36 Later cases developed the drug courier profile to help
determine the parameters of Terry-type searches in airports. 137 The
Terry stop and frisk doctrine also led to the emergence of racial or
ethnic profiles in investigating crime. Race was used in some cases as a
proxy for individualized reasonable suspicion. 138 The police practice of
stopping African American motorists on the basis of race, known as
"Driving While Black," exposed the widespread practice of racial
profiling.1 39
The Fourth Amendment, through safeguarding one's

129. See id.
at 30.
130. Id. at20-21,30-31.
131. Id. at20-21.
132. Id. at 30-31.
133. Id. at 27.
134. See id. at 25, 27.
135. See, e.g., Stuntz, supranote 10, at 2151-52.
136. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431-32, 434 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
497-98 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547-49, 555 (1980).
137. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 494 n.2; Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980).
138. Ryan J. Sydejko, International Influence on Democracy: How Terrorism Exploited a
DeterioratingFourth Amendment, 7 J.L. Soc'Y 220, 251-54 (2006). The author noted that Justice
Brennan in a memorandum on an earlier draft of the Terry opinion expressed concerned about the
impact of Terry on minority communities. Id. at 241-42. Justice Brennan especially feared Terry's
impact in cities such as Miami, Chicago, and Detroit. Id.
139. See Robert C. Power, Changing Expectations of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 16
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reasonable expectation of privacy, fluctuates with the changing rules
that govern police behavior and aid law enforcement.
Terry, thus, ushered in an era of warrantless searches for less than
probable cause based on an ostensibly minimal intrusion on privacy.
The law of criminal procedure changes in both quality and quantity with
respect to dealing with and responding to crime. 140
As one
commentator stated, "the specter of the suicide bomber will play a much
larger role in Fourth Amendment cases than before. ' 141 Random stops
and searches of people only of Arab or Muslim descent at airports
following 9/11 without any individual suspicion was simply ethnic
profiling and discriminatory. 142 Such practices have an impact on a
group's expectations of privacy as victims of these practices. 143 Thus,
racial or ethnic minorities may have lesser expectations of privacy in
being illegally stopped or questioned because past experiences have
resulted in diminished expectations of privacy. 144 Airport encounters
between citizens and police have reduced expectations of privacy
interests to a minimum so that people seldom find reason to decline an
officer's inquiry and walk away. Terry-type balancing of interests has,
therefore, expanded warrantless searches under the reasonableness
umbrella of the Fourth Amendment. The Bush Administration saw the
need to justify warrantless searches for national security on the basis of
perceived terrorist threats. 145 A recently released classified document

WIDENER L. J. 43, 63 (2006). The author noted the substantial body of literature on racial profiling
aimed at African Americans. Id. at 61 n.60. He pointed out that racial profiling became a matter of
public discourse between 1998 and 2001, producing a national consensus against profiling. Id. at 63.
Such a shift may now change in response to the war on terror. Id. at 64.
140. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 10,at 2150. Stuntz argued that higher crime rates have led to
cutbacks in legal protections. Id.at 2138. He argued that the Fourth and Fifth amendment rights
varied with crime and will do so again in the future because the law must reflect a sensible balance
between the social need for order and an individual's desire for privacy and liberty. Id. at 2146.
"This raises a fair question about the one-day crime wave we saw on September 11. Will courts,
including but not limited to the Supreme Court, react as they have to other spikes in serious crime?"
Id. at 2156.
141. Id. at 2158. Changes since 9/11 have already produced changes in people's behavior. It stands
to reason that courts, like other public institutions and the public itself, will likewise see some changes
in behavior sooner rather than later.
142. See Sydejko, supranote 138, at 252.
143. See id. at 252-54.
144. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the FourthAmendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
15, 60-61 (2003). The author noted that expectations vary among groups and that a distinction should
be made about "what degree of privacy people want, what they expect, and what they believe they
have a right to expect." Id. at 60. He noted for example that "[rielatively few middle class whites
expect to be stopped and questioned on the street. For young black males of all social classes,
however, the opposite expectation may hold." Id.
145. R. Jeffrey Smith & Dan Eggen, Post-9111 Memos Show More Bush-Era Legal Errors,WASH.
POST, MAR. 3, 2009, at A5.
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from the United States Department of Justice confirmed the Bush
doctrine of warrantless searches to combat the war on terror. 146 After
September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration also launched the
Terrorist Surveillance Program, a secret program aimed at warrantless
surveillance of communications where one party to the communication
is outside the United States and a suspected member of al Qaeda or
1 47
affiliated with al Qaeda
E. The Emergence of Reasonableness and the Special Needs Doctrines
Although Terry required reasonable suspicion as the basis for a limited
search to justify minimal intrusions of privacy, the Court has expanded
suspicionless, warrantless searches to include administrative searches,
inventory searches, border patrols, sobriety roadblocks, and searches
conducted under the special needs doctrine to combat threats to national
security.
Following Camara, the Court upheld a warrantless
administrative search or inspection of a liquor store licensee,1 48 a
firearms store, 149 and an automobile junkyard. 15 0 These cases involved
heavily regulated businesses where searches were conducted for
inspection purposes.151 The Burger Court noted, "The discovery of
evidence of crimes in the course of an otherwise proper administrative
inspection does not render the search illegal or the administrative
152
scheme suspect."
The administrative searches balanced the government's need for the
search against the privacy interests of regulated business owners and
paved the way for recognizing the validity of searches based on
reasonableness, dispensing with the warrant requirement and probable
cause. In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Court applied
the balancing analysis and reasonable test and extended the warrantless

146. See id.
147. See Press Release, supranote 29; infra Part IV.
148. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
149. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972).
150. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 (1987) (upholding the administrative scheme providing
for warrantless inspections even though in the course of the inspection evidence of a crime might be
discovered).
151. See supranotes 148-50 and accompanying text.
152. Burger, 482 U.S. at 716. Some scholars noted that Burger was not a search under the special
needs doctrine. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee's DNA a Valid Special Needs
Search Under the FourthAmendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme CourtDo?, 34 J.L. MED.
& ETHIcs 165, 177 (2006). However, its significance is important in later cases, such as City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond where the Court invalidated a roadblock whose purpose was to detect
ordinary criminal activity. Id. at 177-78; City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000).
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and suspicionless searches to highway sobriety roadblocks checking for
drunk drivers. 15 3
However, the checkpoints must serve a purpose
independent of general crime control. 15 4 The Court held the highway
sobriety checkpoints reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because
of the State's great interest in alleviating drunk driving, the minimal
intrusion on motorists due to the brief search and seizure, and the
uniform administrative scheme under which the checkpoints were
performed.15 5 Earlier, in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court had invalidated
discretionary, suspicionless spot-checks of a motorist's driver's license
and vehicle registration because no evidence indicated that such stops
would promote highway safety. 15 6 The Prouse Court acknowledged the
validity of the governmental interests in highway safety: "Questioning
of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible
alternative." 157
This acknowledgement paved the way for the
emergence of roadblock checkpoints under the special needs doctrine.
Sitz was therefore important as the first case in which the Court upheld

warrantless and suspicionless searches at roadblocks,
international borders, on public streets within the country.

outside

of

First recognized in New Jersey v. T. L. 0., the special needs doctrine
has developed in cases where the government has demonstrated an
interest independent of the need to conduct an ordinary criminal
investigation and where it would be impracticable to attain a warrant. 158
The T. L. 0. Court said that warrants were not required when school
officials conduct searches for students who are violating school rules and
upheld a warrantless search of a high school student's purse for
cigarettes. 159 Although the Court upheld the warrantless search as
reasonable using the balancing test, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the
application of the balancing test under these circumstances and his
concurrence established the special needs exception. 160
Justice
Blackmun cautioned that the special needs doctrine should be used

153. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447, 455 (1990).
154. Id. at 449-50.
155. Id. at 451, 453.
156. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
157. Id.; see also Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39 ("' [q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type
stops' would be a lawful means of serving this interest in highway safety" (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at
663)).
158. New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 328, 341-42 (majority opinion).
160. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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"[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable cause requirement impracticable ....
,,161 The Court later adopted
the special needs exception, but still retained the balancing test for
administrative searches. 162 What were deemed special needs was not
defined, but the result was to remove a whole category of searches from
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 163
The result is a
diminution in value of certain privacy interests.
The Court has
subsequently found that the special needs doctrine justified an
employer's work-related search of an employee's office, 164 a warrantless
search of a probationer's home for weapons,1 65 drug testing of federal
railroad workers for alcohol, 166 and drug testing of federal customs
agents.1 67 In several cases, the government's chief concerns were for
the safety interests of employees and the public.1 68 The Court has
looked to the government's articulated interest to determine if the need
is separate from a law enforcement purpose.1 69 Although these
comprise a narrow category of cases so far, a high degree of individuals'
privacy interests are involved.
Where the main government purpose was law enforcement or crime
prevention, the Court has declined to extend the special needs
protection. Thus, the Court has refused to apply the doctrine to general
police roadblocks used for the purpose of gathering evidence of drugs.170
For example in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court held
roadblocks, whose primary purpose was the discovery of illegal
narcotics, did not amount to a special need despite the secondary
interest of keeping roads safe.17 1 The roadblocks at issue required a
predetermined number of automobiles to be stopped for a brief period,
conducted searches only when consented to or when there was an
appropriate level of individualized suspicion, and involved a narcotics
detection dog walking around each stopped vehicle.17 2 The Court first

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987).
See id.
Id. at 725-26.
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987).
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 606, 620 (1989).
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989).
See, e.g., id.;
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620; O'Connor,480 U.S. at 725.
See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620; O'Connor,480 U.S. at 725.
See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,44 (2000).
Id.
Id. at 35.
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stated that the Fourth Amendment required all searches to be reasonable,
departing from the traditional requirement of a warrant and probable
cause. 17 3 The Court further noted that there were special circumstances
where it had refused to require individual type suspicion, including
searches under special needs, administrative searches, and highway
checkpoints to intercept illegal aliens, drunk driving, and violations of
vehicle registration. 17 4 All of these searches fall under the rubric of
reasonable searches that require a balancing test instead of probable
cause.175 The central focus under the special needs doctrine is whether
17 6
the search serves a purpose independent of law enforcement needs.
This is the single most important factor.17 7 If this threshold question is
answered in the affirmative, the Court then engages in a balancing of
factors to weigh the need for the search against the offensiveness of the
intrusion. 178
In Edmond, the Court found that the primary focus of the
Indianapolis check-point was to advance the general interest in crime
control. 17 9 The Edmond Court stated, "We are particularly reluctant to
recognize exceptions to the general rule of individualized suspicion
where governmental authorizes primarily pursue their general crime
control ends." 180 According to the majority, these roadblocks were very
different than the sobriety and immigration roadblocks the Court upheld
in earlier cases. 181 Although these were law enforcement activities, the
Edmond Court stated that if general crime control roadblocks were
allowed, there would be little check on the ability of the government to
construct roadblocks for any conceivable purpose and "the Fourth

173. Id. at 37.
174. Id. at 37-38.
175. See id. at 37.
176. See id.
177. Maclin, supra note 152, at 178. Professor Maclin identified several factors in the special needs
analysis. Id. Although no one factor is determinative in the Court's analysis, the purpose factor
appears to be the "first among equals." Id. at 179. Maclin examined the propriety of the special
needs analysis to determine the constitutionality of special needs for DNA sampling of arrested
persons. Id. at 178-79. The criteria for special needs appears to be an examination of "the purpose
of the search; whether law enforcement officials will have access to the results of the search; the
extent of police involvement in conducting the search; and finally, whether the search can be
characterized as serving civil and criminal law interests." Id. Maclin concluded that DNA collecting
statutes serve general law enforcement purposes and are unlikely to meet the first factor in the special
needs analysis. Id. at 179.
178. See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 263, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding the Container Search
Program on New York City subways based on special needs and a balancing analysis of the Program's
reasonableness).
179. Edmond, 531 U.S. at44.
180. Id. at 43.
181. Id. at41-42.
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Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a
routine part of American life." 18 2
Thus, general crime control
roadblocks are prohibited under Edmond.18 3 However, to what extent
would the Edmond decision hold today for anti-terrorism type
roadblocks at airports instead of international borders? Such roadblocks
would undoubtedly have a law enforcement purpose-searching for
evidence of explosives or weapons to prevent terror type attacks. Thus,
the threshold requirement of the special needs doctrine would preclude
such roadblocks. However, there is language in Edmond to suggest a
different result. The Edmond Court stated, "the Fourth Amendment
would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up
to thwart an imminent terrorist attack ....,,184
Certain exigent
18
5
circumstances might justify such roadblocks.
F. Subway Searches as Special Needs
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the subject,
warrantless and suspicionless searches under the special needs doctrine
have widened to include searches conducted on subways and mass
transits. In one of the first important post 9/11 cases, MacWade v.
Kelly, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York and the Second Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a random
search of a passenger's belongings pursuant to a Container Search
Program ("Program") on the New York City subways. 186 In response to
bombings of the public transit system in Madrid in 2004 and in London
in 2005, the New York City Police Department inaugurated the
Program to search passenger bags for explosives on the New York City
subway system. 187 Without any specific threat against the subways, the
City began the Program to prevent attacks or deter terrorists from
carrying concealed explosives onto the subway system. 188 Under the
Program, the searches were to be conducted at certain fixed checkpoints
among the City's subways, and only backpacks and containers were

182. Id. at 42.
183. Id. at 44.
184. Id.
185. Id. ("[T]he Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored
roadblock to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee
by way of a particular route."); see infra Part III.F.
186. MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921RMBFM, 2005 WL 3338573, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,2005),
aff'd, 460 F.3d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 2006).
187. Mac Wade, 460 F.3d at 264.
188. Id. at 267. The City of New York began the Program in response to bombings on subways and
buses in London and Madrid. Id. at 264. The purpose was to prevent such attacks in New York. Id.
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searched.1 89 Uniformed officers gave notice of the search and those
wishing to avoid the search could leave. 190 Declining a search was not a
basis for arrest or individual suspicion, but the police could later search
persons who tried to reenter the subway after declining a search. 191
Officers had no discretion to choose individuals for search; they were
chosen using a numerical selection rate. 192 The Program operated at
randomly selected stations without prior notice. 193 Importantly, only
bags or containers capable of concealing explosives were subject to the
search; individuals were not subject to any stop or frisk unless individual
194
suspicion was later established or contraband was discovered.
Plaintiffs later challenged the City's Program under the equal
protection statute, asserting the searches violated the Fourth
Amendment.195 They further claimed that the special needs exception
did not apply, that the Program was ineffective in discovering terrorists
or explosives, and that persons who refused to be searched should be able
to re-enter the subway at a different stations or checkpoints without fear
of being searched.1 96 As a threshold matter, the plaintiffs claimed that
the special needs doctrine applies only where the subject of the search
has a reduced privacy interest and the search is minimally intrusive. 197
The City claimed that the Program served the important governmental
interest of preventing a terrorist attack and the threat of an explosive
device being taken into the subway system in a carryon container, as had
occurred in Moscow, Madrid, and London. 198 Following a bench trial,
the District Court found that the Program was constitutional as a special
need because it aimed to prevent a terrorist attack on the subways
through deterrence and detection. 199 The court held that "[t]he 'risk to
public safety' of a terrorist bombing of New York City's subway system
'is substantial and real"' and further found that the Program was not
directed "'to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.' 200 The

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

264.
265.

264.
265.
263; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).

196. Mac Wade, 460 F.3d at 269, 270, 275.

197. Id. at 269.
198. Id. at270.

199. MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921RMBFM, 2005 WL 3338573, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2005), aff'd, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006).

200. Id. at *17 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32,41 (2000)).
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District Court then engaged in a balancing of interests to determine if
the Program was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 20 1 Finding
testimony of the City's experts reliable and credible, the District Court
found that the government's need to prevent a terrorist bombing on the
City's subway system "[was] a governmental interest of the very highest
order. '20 2 In weighing the level of intrusion on the privacy interest, the
court found that the Program was narrowly tailored and only minimally
intrusive upon the privacy interests for the following reasons: (1) the
passengers were given notice of the searches by announcements and
signs; (2) the searches were conducted openly and randomly at fixed
checkpoints to subway entrances; (3) individuals could decline the
searches; and (4) the searches were limited in scope as cursory searches
for explosives and were limited in duration, lasting only seconds rather
20 3
than minutes.
The Second Circuit, reviewing the case de novo, affirmed the District
Court's findings and upheld the Container Search Program. 20 4 It was the
first post-9/1 1 case involving mass warrantless searches conducted on
public transportation systems. In United States v. Edwards, the Second
Circuit had previously upheld metal detectors and airline passenger bag
searches to prevent terrorist hijacking. 205 In dispensing with the
traditional warrant requirement in Edwards, the court upheld those
searches on the basis of reasonableness, balancing the need for the
searches against the offensiveness of the intrusion. 20 6 In contrast, in
MacWade, the Second Circuit addressed the applicability of the special
needs doctrine to subway searches. 20 7 Judge Straub, writing for the court,
addressed the central issue of the privacy interest at stake. 2 s The
plaintiffs had argued that the special needs doctrine only applied in cases

201. Id. at *16-18. The District Court looked to the gravity of the government's interest, the degree to
which the Program advances public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty. Id. at *16 (citing Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004)).
202. Id.at * 17. Despite noting that the Supreme Court had counseled against a searching examination
of effectiveness in assessing special needs programs, the District Court was comfortable relying upon
the City's experts who testified that the Program would improve the safety of the subway system. Id.
at *17-18 (citing Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990)). The court cited their
testimony that the deterrent effect of the Program was embedded in the uncertainty of when
inspections would occur and that the introduction of bag searches improved the security of the subway
system. Id. at * 18.
203. Id. at*19.
204. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 275 (2d Cir. 2006).
205. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1974). Edwards predated the special
needs doctrine. See supranote 158 and accompanying text; Mac Wade, 460 F.3d at 268.
206. Edwards,498 F.2d at 500-01.
207. Mac Wade, 460 F.3d at 263.
208. Id.
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where the subject of the search possesses a reduced expectation of
21°
Prior cases involved only minimal privacy interests.
privacy. 2°9
While acknowledging that in most special needs cases the relevant
privacy interests were somewhat limited, the Second Circuit said, "the
Supreme Court never has implied-much less actually held-that a
reduced privacy expectation is a sine qua non of special needs
analysis. '211 The Second Circuit noted that while privacy interests were
an important factor in special needs cases, it had not imposed a
212
threshold requirement that the privacy interests must be diminished.
Further, the court noted that it had expressly rejected the contention
that special needs depends on the privacy interests at stake. 213 The
privacy interests were just one of the factors to be weighed in the
balancing of interests. 2 14 Those balancing factors include: "(1) the
weight and immediacy of the government interest; (2) 'the nature of the
privacy interest allegedly compromised by' the search; (3) 'the
character of the intrusion imposed' by the search; and (4) the efficacy
of the search in advancing the government interest. '215 The court cited
prior cases upholding highway sobriety checkpoints and random airport
searches to illustrate the reasonableness of the subway searches and the
216
minimum level of intrusion.
The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding that
preventing terrorist attacks on subways was a special need, noting that
courts have traditionally found special needs in cases involving either
latent or hidden hazards to public safety or mass transportation systems,
such as trains, airplanes, and highways. 217 Accordingly, the court held
that preventing a terrorist from bombing subways was a special need
distinct from an ordinary criminal purpose. 2 18
The Second Circuit
rejected the plaintiff's argument that terrorist checkpoints could serve
special needs only in cases of imminent attack as an "extraordinarily

209. Id.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004); Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d

652, 669 (2d Cir. 2005).
211. Mac Wade, 460 F.3d at 269.
212. Id. at 269-70.
213. Id. at 270 (citing Nicholas,430 F.3d at 666).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 269 (quoting Bd. ofEduc. ofIndep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 830, 832 (2002)) (internal citations omitted).
216. Id. at 268 (citing Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990); United States v.
Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 2005)).
217. Id. at 270.

218. Id. at271.
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broad legal principle. ' 219 Even though the Program served a special
need, the Second Circuit subjected the Program to a balancing analysis of
interests to determine its reasonableness. 22
The court ultimately
affirmed the District Court and concluded that the Program was
reasonable and constitutional.2 21 The court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the lack of a specific threat to the subway system
222
weakened its immediacy and held that no express threat was required.
All that was required was a real and substantial threat, and preventing
223
terrorists attacks on subways was an immediate and substantial need.
Although subway users had a full expectation of privacy, the impediment
to the privacy interests was minimal, and the Program was reasonably
effective.2 24 In affirming the District Court's findings as not clearly
erroneous, the Second Circuit said it would not "second-guess" City
officials' beliefs regarding the number of checkpoints and their deterrent
effect on terrorism. 225 The court declined to engage in a searching
226
analysis of the deterrent effect of the checkpoints.
The application of the special needs analysis to subway checkpoints
poses many problems under the special needs doctrine, and several
commentators have criticized this application. 227
First, after
acknowledging that subway passengers had a full expectation of privacy,
the MacWade court then diminished those privacy interests and
broadened the ability of the government to advance suspicionless,
warrantless searches. 228 The Second Circuit specifically held that "the
special needs doctrine does not require, as a threshold matter, that the
subject of the search posses a reduced privacy interest. ' 229 In the special
needs context, the government's articulated need to protect public
safety against unknown terrorist threats would always trump the privacy
interests of an individual in their right to be secure in their persons,

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 275.
222. Id. at 272.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 272-75.
225. Id. at 274.
226. Id. at 275.
227. See, e.g., Recent Case, Criminal Law FourthAmendment Second CircuitHolds New York City
Subway Searches ConstitutionalUnder Special Needs Doctrine MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d
Cir. 2006), 120 HARV. L. REV. 635, 642 (2006) ("Mac Wade's broad construction of the special needs
doctrine threatens the privacy interests that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.").
228. Id. at 636.
229. Mac Wade, 460 F.3d at 270.
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papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 23 °
Second, the random nature of the subway searches was unlike airport
searches or roadblock checkpoints where every person or vehicle is
stopped. 23 1
Random searches allow for the opportunity for
individualized discretion and searches based on impermissible factors,
such as race or ethnicity.232 Further, one could argue that subway
searches are sui generis of mass transportation in general. 233 This raises
the question of whether society would regard such searches as a
reasonable trade-off for security.
Would searches on mass
transportation, such as of subways, buses, ferries, or trains, be justified as
an exception to requiring Terry-type individual suspicion?
In Cassidy v. Chertoff, the Second Circuit upheld the warrantless
searches of passenger belongings and automobiles on ferries pursuant to
the Maritime Transportation Security Act. 234 The plaintiffs alleged that
the policy requiring passengers to submit to security checks of bags and
235
cars before boarding the ferries violated the Fourth Amendment.
They also alleged that passengers retained an undiminished and full
expectation of privacy in their carryon baggage and automobiles
onboard ferry. 236 Plaintiffs relied on Bond v. United States where the
Supreme Court found that travelers on an intra-city bus enjoyed a full
expectation of privacy in their carryon luggage because they did not
237
expect bus employees to feel their bags in an exploratory manner.
However, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Sotomayor, did not
accept the plaintiffs contention that Bond precluded a finding of an
undiminished privacy interest and held that, as with any privacy interest
analysis, such expectations depend on the context. 238 The Second
Circuit found that passengers had a full, undiminished expectation of
239
privacy in their belongings, as distinct from their automobiles.
Nonetheless, the court assessed whether there was a special need to
justify the warrantless search of the luggage and cars and held that
230. See Charles J. Keeley III, Subway Searches: Which Exception to the Warrant and Probable
Cause Requirements Applies to Suspicionless Searches of Mass Transit Passengers to Prevent

Terrorism?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3231, 3278 (2006).
231. Id. at 3280.
232. Id. at 3281.
233. Id. at 3270.

234. Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2006).
235. Id. at 74.
236. Id. at 76-77.

237. Id. at 76; see Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000).
238. Cassidy, 471 F.3d at 76. In this context, the passenger searches took place on mass
transportation. Id.
239. Id. at 78.
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prevention of terrorist attacks on large vessels engaged in mass
transportation, as determined by the Coast Guard to be at heightened
risk of attack, constituted a special need. 240 Applying MacWade, the
Second Circuit held that deterring large scale terrorist attacks was a
distinct need from general law enforcement. 241 While the special needs
doctrine as applied to warrantless searches at checkpoints on mass
transportation is unsettled doctrine under the Fourth Amendment, the
fact remains that individual privacy interests and expectations are
subject to change in response to the government's interests in
preventing terror attacks.
IV. ASSAULTS ON REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY INTERESTS

As courts expand the special needs doctrine in support of the
government's interests in combating terrorism, the Fourth Amendment
privacy interests of the American public continue to diminish. The
expansion of warrantless searches to include subway searches under the
special needs exception has further broadened the category of reasonable
searches under Fourth Amendment analysis.2 4 2 The government's
interest in protecting national security has successfully trumped
individual liberty and privacy interests since the 9/11 World Trade
Center attacks. "In the weeks after the attacks, an ABC/Washington
Post poll found that 66 percent of those surveyed were willing to give up
'243
some of their civil liberties to prevent future terrorist attacks.
Passenger screening devices at airports, public buildings, and sporting
venues are now widely accepted. 244 Personal identification checks and
searches of personal belongings at airports are so commonly accepted as
to be reasonably expected.24 5
Thus, one can assume there is a
diminished expectation of privacy in airport travel.2 4 6 Further, mass

240. Id. at 78, 82-85. The plaintiffs argued there was no special need to protect the ferries of Lake
Champlain where there was no obvious terrorist threat. Id. at 83. The Second Circuit noted, "[t]he
Supreme Court, however, has held that the government need not adduce a specific threat in order to
demonstrate a 'special need."' Id. at 83 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
Pottawatomie v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 835-36 (2002)). The Second Circuit gave great deference to the
Coast Guard's determination of a high risk of terrorist attack. Id. at 84.
241. Id.at 82 (citing MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 272 (2d Cir. 2006)).
242. See supraPart III.F.
243. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE

55 (2005).
244. Power, supranote 139, at 60.
245. See id.
246. See id.Polling data of public attitudes following 9/11 illustrate certain findings. People are
willing to part with some measure of individual privacy as a part of the war on terror, but at the same
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video surveillance on the public streets, through cameras and biometric
247
identifications, are changing societal expectations of privacy.

The government's use of power to respond to the war on terror has
abrogated the traditional Fourth Amendment search doctrine and is
expanding. The National Security Administration's ("NSA") increasing

use of warrantless wiretapping and data surveillance to gather foreign
intelligence information, for example, is impacting individuals' privacy
interests. The Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP") and the secret
wiretapping of an American citizen's telephone calls have been justified

on a perceived basis of national security interests and inherent
presidential power to enact wartime measures.248 The constitutionality
of these measures is premised on the argument that Fourth Amendment
protections do not apply to the government's need to conduct domestic
intelligence gathering.2 49 Yet, such arguments completely
precedent, as well as explicit legislative enactments, such
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"). 250
Further,
responses to terror, including the Patriot Act and FISA

have broadened

the government's

ignore judicial
as the Foreign
Congressional
Amendments,

power to conduct warrantless

investigations .251

The government's interception of international telephone and
internet communications of certain individuals without the benefit of a
warrant or probable cause completely bypasses the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement.
After 9/11, the Bush Administration secretly
launched the Terror Surveillance Program without congressional
authorization or judicial oversight. 252 The program was established by
time they are increasingly aware of inroads on privacy and are concerned about giving up too much.
See ROSEN, supranote 243.
247. See ROSEN, supra note 243, at 37. Professor Jeffrey Rosen argued, for example, that
government video surveillance to deter terrorist activities threatens privacy interests, promotes social
conformity, and threatens traditional values of equality. See id. at 53-54. Rosen wrote that the British
system of widespread video cameras had reduced terrorist attacks and crime, but had also required
conformity because people behaved differently if they perceived they were being viewed on camera.
See id. at 37-38.
248. John Yoo, The TerroristSurveillance Programand the Constitution, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 565,
565 (2007); Press Release, supranote 29.
249. See Press Release, supranote 29.
250. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2006) (making FISA the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance of foreign intelligence communications may be conducted); United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct.
for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) (rejecting the government's claim of a national
security exemption from the Fourth Amendment for domestic security).
251. Mell, supra note 35, at 378. Mell addressed some of the provisions of the Patriot Act and its
severe restrictions of the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. The author noted that
several provisions of the Patriot Act reduce privacy interests by allowing governmental surveillance
without judicial oversight and the probable cause and warrant requirements. Id. at 379.
252. Press Release, supranote 29.
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secret order of the President in 2002 and reauthorized at least thirty
times. 25 3 The TSP first became public through an article in the New
York Times on December 16, 2005.254 The following day, the President
confirmed the existence of the program to combat terrorist threats to
the homeland. 255
The program allowed the interception of
communications where one party to the communication is outside the
United States and where the NSA has "a reasonable basis to conclude
that one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated
with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda,
or working in support of al Qaeda. ''25 6 President Bush announced the
program on his own authority without a finding of probable cause or a
judicial warrant. 257
He completely bypassed the congressional
framework established in FISA, which requires a warrant based on
258
probable cause for domestic surveillance of foreign communications.
The President based his authority on the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force adopted by Congress and the inherent powers of the
President under Article II of the Constitution. 259 The Attorney General
claimed that the program was very limited and aimed solely at obtaining
information from the enemy. 260 The TSP was subsequently challenged
in federal district court by the ACLU and a group of journalists, lawyers,
and academias who claimed the program violated the First and Fourth
Amendments, the Separation of Powers clause, and FISA. 261 The
plaintiffs contended that the TSP violated their Fourth Amendment
rights and their legitimate expectations of privacy in overseas
communications. 262 The plaintiffs also asserted a "well grounded belief'
that their communications were being taped or intercepted under the
TSP in violation of the Fourth Amendment and FISA. 263 They further
contended that FISA was the exclusive means by which international
electronic surveillance could be conducted and the TSP operates outside

253. Radio Address, supranote 29.
254. Risen & Lichtblau, supranote 29.
255. Radio Address, supranote 29.
256. Press Release, supranote 29.
257. See id.
258. Id.; see 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2006).
259. See Press Release, supra note 29; Radio Address, supra note 29; see also Yoo, supra note 248, at
570.
260. Press Release, supranote 29.
261. ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev 'd, 493 F.3d 644
(6th Cir. 2007).
262. See id.
263. Id.
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of that statute. 264 In response, the NSA invoked the state secrets
doctrine, asserting that the disclosure or admission of relevant evidence
would expose confidential matters which would be detrimental to
national security. 265 The NSA argued that without the privileged
information none of the named plaintiffs could establish standing for the
alleged injuries. 266 Based on this privilege, the District Court dismissed
one of the plaintiffs' claims but did not dismiss the plaintiffs' remaining
claims challenging the validity of the TSP. 267 The court granted the
plaintiffs a partial summary judgment and issued an order enjoining the
program, finding that the warrantless surveillance program violated the
First and Fourth Amendments, the Separation of Powers clause, and the
268
statutory requirements of FISA.

After a brief discussion of the history of executive abuses through the
British writs of assistance, the District Court found that the Fourth
Amendment requires reasonableness in all searches and that searches
conducted without prior judicial or magistrate approval were per se

unreasonable. 269 The court also engaged in a brief history of electronic
surveillance, addressing Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Control and
Safe Streets Act (governing domestic wire and electronic interceptions)
and the establishment of FISA as the exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence may be conducted. 270 The
court noted that Congress allowed concessions for the executive to
engage in surveillance by complying with the statutory scheme of
FISA. 27 1 The court found that the TSP violated FISA requirements and

264. See id.
265. Id. at 758-59.
266. Id. The state secrets privilege shields such lawsuits from discovery. Id. at 759. The privilege "is
an evidentiary rule developed to prevent the disclosure of information which maybe detrimental to
national security." Id. The privilege has been applied as both an evidentiary privilege and a rule of
non-justiciability. Id.
267. Id. at 766.
268. Id. at 782.
269. Id. at 773-75.
270. Id. at 771-73. Title III contained specific requirements for warrants for domestic eavesdropping
(including the name of target, place to be searched, and duration of the search) and provided for
emergency measures and a post interception warrant within forty-eight hours. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)
(2006).
271. ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 772-73. FISA was established as a result of concerns of the domestic
abuse of surveillance by the government following findings by the Church Committee. Id. at 772.
Under FISA, a court may issue a warrant upon application by the government to obtain foreign
intelligence if there is probable cause to believe that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power
or agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2006). It is distinguishable from a traditional warrant
in that there is no requirement that there be probable cause that a crime has been committed. See id.
The FISA warrant proceedings are ex parte. Id. After the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Patriot
Act which amended FISA to expand its coverage. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
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22
the First and Fourth Amendments.

The NSA appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit, arguing that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the TSP and that the state secrets
doctrine prevented a decision on the merits. 27 3 The Sixth Circuit agreed
and reversed the District Court, finding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to raise their clams and that the state secrets doctrine
prevented them from establishing that they had ever been subject to the
alleged wiretapping. 27 4 The court held that the plaintiffs had only
asserted a well-founded belief that they had been subject to search by the
TSP. 275 According to the court, the plaintiffs' main argument was that
the NSA violated their legitimate expectation of privacy in overseas
telephone and email conversations without complying with FISA, yet
the plaintiffs could not produce evidence that their communications had
ever been intercepted or were ever subject to search.27 6 The plaintiffs'
alleged injury stemmed only from their refraining from communications
to their clients. 277 The court said it would be unprecedented to allow
plaintiffs to litigate the Fourth Amendment claim "without any
evidence that [they] have been subjected to an illegal search or
seizure. ' 278 The court engaged in a detailed analysis of the standing
doctrine and held that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing for their
constitutional challenges, as well as their statutory claims. 27 9 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs could not establish standing under FISA for
the same reason they could not maintain their Fourth Amendment
claim-they could not establish that they were actually the target of, or
subject to, NSA's surveillance and, thus, were not aggrieved persons
under FISA's statutory scheme. 280 The Sixth Circuit decision reversed
the District Court on standing grounds, thereby precluding any decision
on the constitutionality of the TSP and its impact on the privacy rights
281
of Americans .

272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
272. ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
273. ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 2007).
274. Id. at 653,687-88.
275. Id.at 654.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 656.
278. Id.at 673-74.
279. Id. at 658-87.
280. Id. at 683. The court also held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the NSA wiretapping
satisfied the statutory definition of electronic surveillance as required by FISA and that FISA did not
authorize the declaratory or injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs. Id.
281. See id. at 687-88.
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Public criticism of the TSP has been overwhelming. The public first
learned of the program through a report published in the New York
Times. 282 Civil liberties groups, law professors, and members of Congress
criticized the TSP for infringing on privacy rights of American
citizens. 283 Some legal scholars, however, were critical of the District
Court's reasoning in invalidating the program on First and Fourth
Amendment grounds and the failure by the court to engage in sufficient
analysis of the role of the FISA. 284 They also criticized the decision for
its failure to take into account the special needs exception to the
warrant requirement. 285 Members of Congress later called for a special
investigation into the TSP, a program reminiscent of the widespread
domestic spying in United States v. United States District Court ("Keith
Case"). 286 They contended that respect for the rule of law commands
that the wiretapping program comply with the FISA requirements or
other
congressionally
mandated
means
to
conduct
counter
intelligence. 287 The Court's decision in 1972 in the Keith Case squarely
addressed a question left open in Katz-whether domestic eavesdropping,
even for national security purposes, required a judicial warrant. 288 The
Court declined to address whether the Fourth Amendment applied to
foreign intelligence. 289 The decision only rejected the government's
claim of a national security exception for domestic spying because of its
impact on civil liberties. 290 The Court concluded:
[t]he Government's concerns do not justify departure in
this case from the customary Fourth Amendment
requirement of judicial approval prior to initiation of a
search or surveillance. Although some added burden will
be imposed upon the Attorney General,
this

282. See Risen & Lichtblau, supranote 29.
283. See, e g., Adam Liptak, Many Experts Fault Reasoning of Judge in Surveillance Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2006, at Al.

284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Letter from Rep. Zoe Lofgren et al., to President George W. Bush (Feb. 26, 2006), available at
http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/wdc/documents/O60224congress nsa.pdf
[hereinafter
Lofgren Letter]; United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
287. Lofgren Letter, supranote 286.
288. U.S. Dist Ct. for the E. Dist of Mich., 407 U.S. at 299. The Keith Case involved electronic
eavesdropping authorized by the Attorney General of a defendant's conversations because the
defendant was charged with bombing the Central Intelligence Agency. Id. at 299-300. The wiretaps
were not authorized by law or a judicial officer. Id. at 301. The government claimed that the
surveillance was lawful to protect national security as a reasonable exercise of governmental
authority. Id.
289. Id. at 321-22.
290. Id. at 321.
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inconvenience is justified in a free society to protect
291
constitutional values.
Many commentators also believed that evidence obtained through the
TSP without a warrant may have been used in applications for FISA
warrants. 29 2 Recent revelations in April 2009 have now indicated that
the NSA had been engaged in an over-collection of domestic
communications of American citizens, even after efforts to bring the
program under the statutory authority of FISA. 293 Again, the public was
alarmed and President Barack Obama and members of Congress called
294
for a review of the operations of the TSP.
The public outcry over the TSP has produced controversy and swift
reform.
Numerous lawsuits challenged the TSP on constitutional
grounds and as a violation of FISA. 295 The Bush Administration
abandoned the program in the midst of public outcry over the failure to
296
follow the Fourth Amendment and the FISA warrant requirements.
Later in the Summer of 2007, Congress passed the Protect America Act
("PAA"), which amended FISA to include the type of surveillance under
the TSP. 297 The Administration contended that gathering foreign
intelligence of targets overseas did not require a warrant. 29 The new law
changed the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act to exclude
"surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located
outside of the United States. '299 It changed the requirements for a
warrant by giving authority to the Attorney General and Director of
National Intelligence ("DNI") to authorize telecommunication
companies to acquire foreign intelligence of persons believed to be
outside the United States up to a period of one year. 311 It was later

291. Id.
292. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Officials Say US. Wiretaps Exceed Law, N.Y. TIMES,
April 16, 2009, at Al.
293. Id.
294. See id.
295. See, e.g., Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Al-Haramain
Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007).
296. Letter from Atf'y Gen. Alberto R. Gonzalez to Comm. of the Judiciary Chariman Patrick Leahy
and Senator Arlen Specter (Jan. 17, 2009), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/
packages/pdf/politics/20060117gonzales Letter.pdf.
297. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55,121 Stat. 552 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1801-1805 (2006 & Supp. 2009)), repealed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436.
298. Radio Address, supranote 29.
299. Protect America Act of 2007 § 2, 50 U.S.C. § 1805a (Supp. 2009) (repealed by Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 § 403).
300. Id. § 1805b(a).
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renewed following a six month sunset provision."

1

Under the new law, if the purpose of wiretapping was to gather
information on persons outside the United States who communicated
with persons inside the United States, such communications would not
fall under FISA. 30 2 Thus, there was no longer a requirement of a prior
judicial warrant to gather surveillance evidence. 30 3 Moreover, the
authority was now shifted to the Attorney General and the DNI and
away from the judicial process. 30 4 The PAA came under new criticism as
well for broadening surveillance powers. 305 The TSP only authorized
warrantless surveillance of Americans communicating with al Qaeda
and/or persons associated with al Qaeda. 30 6 The PAA contained no such
limitation for the purposes of gathering of information. 30 7 The original
FISA statutory scheme, which required judicial warrants, was based on
protecting a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. 308 There were
no such statutory safeguards in the PAA. 30 9 The legislation did,
however, provide for minimization procedures to minimize the privacy
impact on United States citizens. 310 Moreover, the determination by
the DNI and the Attorney General that a person reasonably thought to
be outside the United States and communicating with persons in the
United States was subject to judicial review by the FISA court. 311 This
same statutory framework was later included in the subsequent legislation
by Congress, the FISA Amendment Act of 2008.312 Civil liberties
groups challenged the PAA as violating the First and Fourth
Amendments because it allowed for broader surveillance of
313
communications.
The extent to which the Fourth Amendment constrains Congressional

301. See Protect America Act of 2007 § 6.
302. Protect America Act of 2007 § 2.
303. See Juan P. Valdivieso, Recent Development, Protect America Act of 2007, 45 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 581, 581 (2008).

304. See supranote 300 and accompanying text.
305. Valdivieso, supranote 303, at 589.
306. Id.
307. See supranote 299 and accompanying text.
308. Valdivieso, supranote 303, at 583.
309. Id.
310. Protect America Act of 2007 § 2, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (Supp. 2009).
311. Id. § 1805(a)(1) (repealed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008 § 403).
312. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261,
122 Stat. 2436 (to be codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1805).
313. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Fact Sheet on the "Police America Act," http://
www.aclu.org/safefreespying/ (last visited Jan. 15,2010).
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power to authorize foreign surveillance of communications is
unsettled. 314
The larger question is whether the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy framework and the subsequent special needs
doctrine should apply to foreign surveillance conducted for national
security purposes. Katz itself involved wiretapping for purely general
law enforcement purposes and not foreign intelligence. 315 Some have
argued that the playing field has changed and that expectations have
changed in favor of broadening the government power to conduct
warrantless searches for national security purposes. 316 The Supreme
Court has not made clear the scope of Fourth Amendment protection
within the context of foreign surveillance. 317 Some scholars have argued
that searches undertaken for national security should pass the Court's
reasonableness test for warrantless searches. 318 They contend that there
are compelling reasons for favoring warrantless searches during the war
319
on terror and that the security of the nation is a compelling interest.
"[N]o governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the
Nation. '' 320 John Yoo and Glenn Sulmasy, for example, wrote that the
Katz and FISA framework of probable cause is unworkable in today's
national security applications. 321 "[T]he real problem with warrant
requirements and Katz [is that s]earches and wiretaps must target a
specific individual already believed to be involved in criminal activity....
Rather than individual suspicion, searching for terrorists will depend on
probabilities, just as with roadblocks or airport screenings. '322 This is
premised on the view that foreign intelligence will require a much larger
net to capture necessary information and that the FISA or Katz warrant
based requirements "sacrifice speed and breadth of information in favor
of individualized suspicion. ' 323 Yet, FISA itself, prior to present
amendments, allowed for temporary wiretaps without a warrant in
emergency and war situations. 324 Yoo and Sulmasy concluded that Katz
is inapplicable to searches conducted for national security matters and

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Valdivieso, supranote 303, at 591.
See Katz . United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
See, e.g., Sulmasy & Yoo, supranote 103, at 1236-37.
See supranote 289 and accompanying text.
Sulmasy & Yoo, supranote 103, at 1236.
Id. at 1236-37.
Id. at 1237 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)).
Id. at 1224, 1245.
Id. at 1244-45.
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1250.
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would harm national security.325
V. SHOULD THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST APPLY IN
COUNTERTERRORISM?

The elasticity of the reasonable expectation of privacy test bodes ill
for protection of an individual's privacy in the context of terrorist
threats. Both the courts and the public have acquiesced to intrusive
government measures instituted to prevent terrorism and protect
national security. 326 As the public accepts each new encroachment on
personal liberty as necessary for personal and national safety, the courts
327
acquiesce as well due to the public's reduced expectations of privacy.
Since Katz, expectations of privacy that once accompanied an
individual's walk through the world have shrunk to the threshold of a
person's dwelling-the expectation of privacy in one's home. Similarly,
the warrant protections of the Fourth Amendment have lost their power
due to technological advances that search masses of information without
identifying particular individuals, places, or things. 328 Once the data
reveals certain patterns of information categorized as potentially
threatening to security, however, individuals are then targeted for
further investigation or seizure of the content of their
communications. 329 Because the gathering of the information does not
identify individuals, the searches are deemed both public and innocuous
and, thus, not subject to privacy protections.
In the context of the government's technology-enhanced search
capabilities, such as dataveillance, the Fourth Amendment appears to
offer little or no protection of privacy based on either the
reasonableness test or the general warrant clause. Is there any hope,
then, for protection of individual privacy when technology enables the
government, citing the threat to national security in light of world-wide
terrorism, to gather private and personal information?
Courts continue to hold that individuals have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their personal space, at the maximum within their home
and at the minimum within their personal effects closely connected to

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. at 1222.
See supraParts III and IV.
See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
See ROSEN, supra note 243, at 22-23.
See id.
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their persons, such as traveling bags. 330 Is this rather limited sphere of
privacy strong enough to protect other personal items, such as the
contents of private communications? If the courts have protected the
contents of letters, although not their outside address information, could
the courts also accept as a reasonable expectation of privacy the
contents of personal communications intended to be private, such as
personal email, but not Facebook, Twitter, or mass emailing? Both the
reasonable expectations test and the general warrant clause should be reinvigorated for the protection of an individual's person, belongings, and
self-expression or self-actualization that does not harm or threaten
harm to others.
Modern technology has created a form of the general warrant through
the use of mass data surveillance of personal records based on the need
for national or domestic security. 331 A form of data profiling has also
emerged, creating a prototype of who is to be searched or seized before
embarking upon an airplane. 332 Yet, the increased perceived threat to
security from unknown terrorists cannot ignore the everyday threat
from the erratic, unpredictable criminal suspect who unleashes violence
upon public institutions and individuals.
Tragically, courthouses,
schools, and colleges have been the recipients of both targeted and
333
random acts of violence.
Confronting terrorism and engaging in covert intelligence are
necessary measures in protecting national security. Yet individual
liberty and privacy as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment should not
be sacrificed for these goals. The nation itself was founded on the
perceived needs of safeguarding liberty and security of the individual
against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. 334 The
Fourth Amendment requirements of a probable cause based warrant and
reasonableness of searches has changed over time, however. For many
years, reasonable searches were premised on obtaining a judicial warrant
based on probable cause. 335 Katz declared that Fourth Amendment
protections must be grounded on a reasonable subjective expectation of
privacy that society regards as reasonable. 336
Those privacy
330. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334,
338-39 (2000).
331. See ROSEN, supra note 243, at 22-23.
332. Id. at 102.
333. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Suspect Kills 3, Including Judge, Atlanta Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2005, at Al.
334. See supranotes 41-46.
335. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
336. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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expectations change over time and in conjunction with the
government's expressed need for more intrusive searches. Moreover
changes in communications, technology, and surveillance have affected
privacy interests as well. "With each new surveillance technique, the
Supreme Court attempted to refine the notion of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment. As a result, the parameters of privacy rights that
may be protected are in flux. '337 However, the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirements have solidified judicial protection of privacy
against unreasonable searches and seizures when it comes to an
individual's home; courts have stood firm in halting technological
338
intrusion at the front door.
In Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court determined that the use
of thermal imaging devices to gather information regarding the interior
of a home without physical invasion constituted a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes. 339

The Court stated, "Where,

as here, the

Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical invasion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant. '340 The holding of Kyllo was limited to
searches of the home and the expectation of privacy in the home,
however. 341 Although the Court had previously ruled that pen registers,
which register the phone numbers dialed, are not entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection, 342 it is unclear if that holding extends to
internet and email communications. The Smith decision was premised
on the notion that pen registers did not reveal the content of oral
communications but only the numbers dialed. 343
Yet, present
technology that intercepts email and internet communications between
persons outside the United States and persons within the United States is
now authorized for foreign intelligence gathering purposes. 344 Similar
advances in computer technology have affected Fourth Amendment
expectations of privacy. As electronic surveillance becomes more
intrusive and widespread, privacy expectations will diminish. Other
intrusive forms of surveillance technology, such as CCTV cameras
forms, GPS locators, and RFID, also enhance the government's ability
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Mell, supranote 35, at 389.
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001).
Id. at 34.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
Id. at 741.
See supranotes 295-312 and accompanying text.
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to monitor private lives. Although people who share information with
others via Facebook, mass emails, or Twitter appear to have limited
privacy expectations while using those tools, they do appear to expect
privacy in other forms of technologically enhanced communication.
Mass datavelliance is different, therefore, and arguably falls within the
area of fundamental privacy interests in the home and person that
courts continue to protect.
Mass dataveillance of communications originating from the home
"gives the government essentially unlimited discretion to search through
masses of personal information in search of suspicious activity, without
'345
specifying in advance the people, places, or things it expects to find.
Thus, dataveillance is like a fishing expedition and could be interpreted
to violate the privacy rights of individuals and citizens. The attempts to
reform the FISA program to include the TSP-type surveillance of
foreign communications outside the United States indicate the
continuing existence of an expectation of privacy in those
communications. Thousands of emails and telephone calls of Americans
have been intercepted under the new surveillance program. 346 It is not
clear whether the NSA listened to conversations or simply had access to
the email addresses and phone numbers. 347 This kind of government
action underscores the real problem with dataveillance-it is not
suspicion- or target-based but rather seeks to cast a wide net of
information gathering. In the absence of any demonstrated threat to
security, it infringes on the privacy rights of innocent persons in the
name of national security. Privacy is, thus, harmed not as an abstract
value, but as an aspect of liberty affecting freedom to communicate ideas
using telecommunications technology. We expect our communications
through telephones, emails, or cell phones to be private. Congressional
investigations hope to determine if any further searches of the content
348
of the communications violated the Act.
This instance of mass data surveillance is not unique.
Other
electronic surveillance measures undertaken pursuant to the Patriot Act
have also resulted in seizures of email communications and internet
communications. The Patriot Act broadens the scope of pen registers
and trace statutes to permit the government to track email and internet

345. ROSEN, supra note 243, at 148.
346. See Eric Schmitt, SurveillanceEffort Draws Civil Liberties Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009,
at A12.
347. See id.
348. See Lofgren Letter, supranote 286.

2009]

CHANGING TIDES

communications. 349 Under the Act, courts are permitted to authorize
the installation of a pen register or a trap and trace device to capture
internet and telephone dialing, routing, addressing or signaling
information whenever the government believes the information is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. 35 0
In essence, the
government can collect information about an individual's online
searches. 35 1 This raises the question of whether privacy interests are
infringed. The Katz Court long ago held that the wiretapping of a
telephone conversation constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment and required a warrant. 35 2 Websites and internet addresses
reveal more than the telephone numbers of a pen register or the
addresses on an envelope. They provide insight into an individual's
mind and thoughts-the essence of personhood-and should be
protected by the Fourth Amendment. 35 3 An individual's expectation of
privacy should not diminish simply because they use the internet or
email. The privacy implications are no less important. Distinct from
the phone numbers dialed and collected, computer users do not expect
the government or the internet providers to monitor their content or
web usage. Individuals have an expectation of privacy in their emails
and in the use of the internet, although information regarding web
browsing may be readily available through software.
Further,
expectations of privacy should extend to non-content communications,
such as addresses. 35 4 The seizure of email addresses, for example,
exposes the content of the communications. 355 Yet, the District Court
of Oregon held that there is no Fourth Amendment protection of the
"to" or "from" envelop of an email or the IP addresses of websites. 35 6
This holding was based on the notion that what is communicated to third
parties, such as phone numbers dialed, is not subject to Fourth
Amendment protection. 357 The court relied on Smith v.Maryland,

349. USA PATRIOT Act of2001 § 1, 18 U.S.C. §§3121-3127 (2006).
350. Id. § 3121.
351. See id.
352. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
353. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Smith, The USA PATRIOTAct Violating Reasonable Expectationsof Privacy
Protected by the FourthAmendment Without Advancing National Security, 82 N.C. L. REV. 412, 441
(2003). The author argued, "the Fourth Amendment protects all electronic communications, both
content and envelope information . . . . The Fourth Amendment requires the recognition of an
expectation of privacy because the monitoring of computer usage and communications implicates
privacy concerns that are absent in the monitoring of telephone numbers dialed." Id. at 441-42.
354. See supranote 353 and accompanying text.
355. Id.
356. Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467-ST, 2004 WL 2066746, at *19, *22 (D. Or. Sept. 15,
2004).
357. Id. at *22.
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which upheld the constitutionality of the use of a pen register to
intercept dialed phone numbers but not the content of
communications. 358 Smith was premised on the notion that there is no
privacy expectation in a phone number dialed, even from the privacy of
the home, because callers voluntarily give this information to third
parties such as the phone companies. 359 The District Court of Oregon
extended this rationale to include the addresses of internet
communications. 360 However, that reasoning is flawed because email
addresses do reveal content, unlike telephone numbers in pen registers or
addresses on envelopes.

361

Recent cell phone technology has also expanded law enforcement's
ability to monitor the whereabouts of cell phone users by using the cell
phone as a "tracking device. ' 362 Whenever a phone is turned on,
363
wireless providers can now monitor a cell phone user's location.

Operators have recently turned over such data to prosecutors when
presented with court orders. 364 Moreover, prosecutors have argued that
expansion of powers under the Patriot Act could be read to allow cell
phone tracking on less than probable cause. 365 In contrast, the Kyllo

Court held that the use of digital technology for electronic invasion of

366
the home without a warrant violates Fourth Amendment interests.
The Kyllo Court expressed limitations on the role of technology used in

criminal law enforcement in the home when such technology is not in
public use. 367

However, the expansion of government surveillance of

private information for national security purposes under the Patriot Act

358. Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-44 (1979)).
359. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
360. Thygeson, 2004 WL 2066746, at *19.
However, some scholars have criticized the application of the Smith rationale to computer information
that is subject to surveillance under the Patriot Act. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 353, at 447.
361. Smith, supranote 353, at 447.
362. Matt Richtel, Live Tracking of Mobile Phones Prompts Court Fights on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2005, at Al; Jonathan Krim, FBI Dealt Setback on Cellular Surveillance, WASH. POST, Oct.
28, 2005, at A5. Courts in Texas and New York denied the FBI's request to track the location of cell
phone users without showing evidence that a crime has occurred or was in progress. In re Application
of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device,
396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device
with Cell Site Location Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005). The courts did grant the
FBI requests for information pertaining to the logs of phone numbers called and received from the cell
phones. In re Application of the United States for an Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 296-97; In re
Applicationfor Pen Register, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 748, 765.
363. Richtel, supranote 362.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001).
367. Id.
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has weakened Fourth Amendment privacy interests.
At least a few courts have recognized that privacy interests are at
issue in electronic surveillance in the home without a warrant.368 The
District Court for the Southern District of Texas has ruled that
"permitting surreptitious conversion of a cell phone into a tracking
device without probable cause raises serious Fourth Amendment
concerns, especially when the phone is monitored in the home or other
places where privacy is reasonably expected. ' 369 Cell phone tracking
obviously aids law enforcement in emergency situations, but it is unclear
what standards courts will use in permitting the general use of cell phone
tracking without reasonable suspicion of individuals outside the home on
public streets. The District Court for the Southern District of New York
has ruled that probable cause is not required when the cell phone cite
information is used only to track calls made or received by the cell
phone user. 370 In that case, no data was disclosed that could triangulate
371
the precise location of the cell phone use.

Expansion of government searches through video surveillance, cell
phone tracking, searches of a passenger's belongings on public
transportation, stadium searches, stop and seizures of persons on the
streets, and vehicle searches raises concerns about Fourth Amendment
privacy interests. Simply because something is viewed publicly does not
necessarily lessen one's privacy interests under the Katz reasonable
expectation test, which provides protection for privacy interests that
society regards as reasonable. 37 2 However, what one exposes to the
public or what can be observed from a lawful vantage point has been
regarded as not deserving Fourth Amendment protection under the plain
view doctrine. 37 3 This category has been broadened to a large degree by
technological surveillances since 9/11. Mass video surveillance, digital
face imagery, and biometric surveillance in public reduce objective
expectations of privacy and, correspondingly, Fourth Amendment
protections. The inherent dangers of unsupervised video data collection

368. See supranote 362 and accompanying text.
369. In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority, 396
F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
370. In re Application of the United States of America for an Order for Disclosure of
Telecommunications Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F.
Supp. 2d 435, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
371. Id. at 449.
372. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
373. Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
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and false positives may be viewed as infringing on liberty interests.
Individuals, for example, could be identified for low level crimes and
permanently identified in data files for suspected activity. Moreover,
surveillance of innocent yet suspicious activity violates privacy
interests. Ostensibly to prevent terrorist activities, a growing number of
police departments in cities such as Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles
are monitoring public behavior which they deem suspicious. 37 4 Police
have monitored activities such as taking pictures of power plants and
public buildings and purchasing police or firefighter uniforms. 375 The
police explain this approach as stemming from the behavior of terrorists
who typically engage in surveillance of targets before an attack. 37 6 The
information gathered by the police is later catalogued on a terror tips
377
list, which may be used for intelligence gathering purposes.
Ultimately, the police hope to have a nationwide reporting system of
codes for suspicious activity. 378 The privacy concern that arises here is
that the overbroad recording of innocent activity interferes with the
privacy rights of individuals. However, such activity is deemed both
public and innocuous and, therefore, not subject to privacy concerns
despite the paramount liberty interests of innocent individuals.

Even more latitude is given to law enforcement officers in street
encounters, regardless of improper motivation. According to the New
York Times, a twenty-four-year-old Muslim-American journalism student
was stopped in September 2007 by Veteran Affairs Police in New York
for taking pictures of flags in front of a Veterans Affairs building as part
of a class assignment. 379 The officers took the student into custody for
questioning and deleted the images from the camera. 381 In a similar
situation, a fifty-four-year-old artist and fine arts professor at the
University of Washington was stopped, searched, handcuffed, and placed
in a police squad car for taking photographs of electrical power lines as
part of an art project. 381 Innocent activity, such as taking photographs
of public buildings, can trigger application of a terror checklist when

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

Schmitt, supranote 346.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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combined with other factors such as race or ethnicity. 382 Such practices
may lead to the potential for abuse and for religious, racial, and ethnic
profiling.
These factors alone do not justify individualized suspicion under the
Terry stop and frisk doctrine. Stopping and seizing a person of Arab
descent for taking a picture of a public building should still be an
unreasonable search in a free society. Yet, a recent trial in a Georgia
federal court of a suspected terrorist, Syed Harris Ashmed, revealed that
the defendant used casing videos of the World Bank building in
Washington to prove that he could engage in surveillance "when
terrorist overseas couldn't even get in the country. ' 383 However,
evidence also showed that Ahmed bought a one-way ticket to a Pakistan
military training camp, 384 which combined with the videos was sufficient
to bypass privacy protections. Race, national origin, or ethnicity alone
cannot form sufficient cause for the police to stop and question the
385
public on the basis of innocent activity.
Individual liberties cannot be curtailed for purposes of intelligence
gathering. A public search or seizure without a warrant, probable cause,
or reasonable suspicion violates Fourth Amendment liberty and privacy
interests. 386 Racial profiling under the Terry stop and frisk doctrine had
long been condemned prior to the 9/11 terror attacks. 387 According to a
Gallop Poll, eighty-one percent of Americans opposed racial
profiling. 388
Yet, there now appears to be an emerging public
acceptance of some form of ethnic profiling.
After 9/11, an
ABC/Washington Post poll found that seventy-one percent of
Americans were willing to give up some liberties to prevent future
terrorist attacks. 389 Undoubtedly, there has been some public acceptance
of airport passenger profiling based on people of Middle Eastern

382. See id.
383. See Bill Rankin, Defendant "FellPrey" to Extremist, Lawyer Says Ex-Tech Student Offered Help
to Terrorists,ProsecutorsSay; But ProsecutorClaims Actions "Not Child's Play", ATLANTA J. CONST.,

June 2, 2009, at 1OA.
384. Id.

385. See Power, supranote 139, at 69.
386. Id. at 47-48.

387. Frank Newport, Racial Profiling is Seen as Widespread, ParticularlyAmong Young Black Men,
GALLUP

NEWS

SERV.,

Dec.

9,

1999,

http://www.gallup.com/poll/3421/Racial-Profiling-Seen-

Widespread-Particularly-Among-Young-Black-Men.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2010) (more than
eighty percent of Americans disapprove of the practice of racial profiling).
388. Id.

389. ABC News/Washington Post Poll: Response (Sept. 13, 2001), http://abcnews.go.
com/images/PollingUnit/864al o20Response%/20to0 20Terror.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,2010).
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descent. 390 Police encounters with people of Arab ancestry sharply
increased after 9/1 1.391 Some have argued that it is rational to stop and
question persons of Arab ancestry. 392 Fortunately, civil libertarians have
opposed these measures, and airports have adopted rules and regulations
requiring screening of all persons aboard a passenger aircraft. 393 Airport
searches, it must be noted, are generally viewed as special needs or sui
394
generis, so probable cause or reasonable suspicion is not required.
Americans, who take pictures of public monuments in Washington
during vacations or otherwise, should not expect that their very
identities be recorded as part of general surveillance.
But, our
expectations of privacy may shift when we are in a public space. Public
surveillance, however, is quite different from general warrantless
physical searches.
As preventive measures, physical searches of
individuals entering public buildings, such as museums, football stadiums,
and public transportation systems, affect Fourth Amendment privacy
interests.
In addition to searches of handbags or containers for
explosive devices, law enforcement has been expanding the scope of
physical searches in the name of public security. In Johnston v. Tampa
Sports Authority, a Tampa Bay football season ticket holder challenged
the Tampa stadium authority's practice of requiring all spectators to
submit to a pat-down search. 395 The Tampa Bay Buccaneers instituted
the policy because the NFL mandated pat-down searches as a condition
for entrance to NFL events. 396 As in the New York City subway
searches, the NFL policy was instituted following the 2004 and 2005
suicide bombings in London and Madrid and threats made to sporting
events, such as the soccer venues in Spain. 397 Prior to this policy, bags,
purses, and other containers were searched, but there were no physical
searches of persons. 391 Johnston was searched upon entering a Tampa
football game and brought suit. 399 The District Court found that the
searches violated the Florida Constitution and the Fourth Amendment

390. See Power, supranote 139, at 65 & n.67.
391. Randa
A.
Kayyali,
The People Perceived as
a
Threat to
Security:
Arab Americans
Since
September
11,
MIGRATION
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July
2006,
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfin?ID=409 (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
392. ABC News/Washington Post Poll: Response, supranote 389.
393. Power, supranote 139, at 65-66.
394. See id. at 55.
395. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 530 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008).
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1323 n.1.
398. Id. at 1323 n.3.
399. Id. at 1323.
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and granted a preliminary injunction. 400 The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
finding that the District Court abused its discretion and misapplied the
consent exception to warrantless searches. 40 1 The Eleventh Circuit held
that Johnston's football ticket was a revocable license to attend NFL
games and that Johnston had voluntarily consented to the pat-down
searches. 40 2 The Tampa Bay Buccaneers had simply given Johnston a
revocable license to enter the stadium to attend football games, which
could be revoked or rescinded at any time. 403 The court also held that
the consent doctrine was applicable under Florida law. 40 4 In a footnote,
the Eleventh Circuit declined to address whether any other special needs
405
exception applied to the case.
The Circuit Court in Johnston noted that it had addressed the
constitutionality of warrantless searches in other contexts involving
entrance to public lands.40 6 In Bourgeois v. Peters, the Circuit Court
invalidated a municipal policy that required suspicionless magnetometer
searches of all persons seeking to attend demonstrations on public
property outside of Fort Benning, Georgia. 407 The City justified the
searches in light of past conduct of trespassing, smoke bombs, and
40 8
heightened homeland security threats occurring at demonstrations.
The Circuit Court invalidated the program on the ground that it had
impaired First Amendment rights, as well as Fourth Amendment
rights. 409 Moreover, the City's enacted magnetometer policy served the
traditional law enforcement function of public safety and was therefore
not a special need. 410 While the Circuit Court in Johnston did not

400. Id.

401. Id. at 1325.
402. Id. at 1324, 1326-27 n.7.
403. Id. at 1326-27 n.7.
404. Id. at 1326. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prohibits terminating benefits, though not
entitlements, on the basis of relinquishing a constitutional right. Id. at 1327 (citing State v. laccarino,
767 So. 2d 470, 476 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)). The Circuit Court disagreed with the District Court that
the consent doctrine did not apply in this case because of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Id.
"Johnston did not have any right or entitlement to enter the stadium." Id. Applying the consent factors
under Florida law, the court found Johnston had voluntarily consented and was aware that he could
refuse to be searched and leave the stadium. Id. at 1326.
405. Id. at 1326-27 n.7. Because the court found the consent doctrine applicable, the court declined
to engage in any special needs analysis. Id. It noted, however, that there was "at least a question
concerning whether Johnston's constitutional rights would have been violated by the pat-down search,
even if he had not consented." Id.
406. Id.
407. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004).
408. Id.

409. Id. at 1325.
410. Id. at 1312-13 ("[I]t is difficult to see how public safety could be seen as a governmental interest
independent of law enforcement; the two are inextricably intertwined.").
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address the special needs doctrine, the court said, "Unlike the searches
for drugs, bottles, and cans... , the pat-down searches in this case
supported an interest well beyond general law enforcement. '4 11 The
NFL clearly instituted the pat-down policy to prevent terrorist attacks
and ensure the safety of persons in the stadium. 4 12 These cases, along
with McWade v. Kelly, involving subway searches, 4 13 illustrate an
individual's diminished expectation of individual privacy that exists in
access to public stadiums and public transit systems based on perceived
terrorist threats.
Pat-down searches at stadium sporting events are now widely expected
and accepted. Under the Katz formulation, such expectations are
objectively reasonable even though there may be no credible or reliable
threat. 414 In Johnston, the NFL adopted the policy on the basis of the
suicide bombings in Madrid and London and the threats made to sporting
events. 415 The FBI later determined there were no threats to NFL
stadiums. 416 Yet, pat-down searches, which restrict individual privacy
and liberty, are viewed as reasonable searches under the Court's balancing
analysis. These limitations on individual privacy are deemed acceptable
as non-emergency matters of public safety.
Although the subway searches and the Tampa stadium search involve
perceived external, international threats of terrorist activity under a
special needs approach, they pose special concern because Fourth
Amendment rights change relative to the weight of the liberty and
safety interest at stake. 417
Would such searches be acceptable at
entrances to city buses and trains as a routine aspect of American life
absent emergency threats to public security? Even under the special
needs category, there must in fact be a special need independent of
general criminal enforcement of the law. 418 The Supreme Court has
never applied the special needs exception to suspicionless searches on
subways, public buildings, parks, and stadiums. The administrative search
doctrine applicable to housing inspections in Camara seems inapplicable
to the search of people and their belongings at on public arenas and
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venues. 419
There are inherent problems in identifying threats to public safety
and security as special needs in the absence of an emergency situation.
Public safety measures as a part of general law enforcement must meet
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Emergencies and
extraordinary circumstances may justify a limited warrantless search as
reasonable to prevent widespread public harm. 420 In such cases, the
weight of the intrusion of privacy interests is weighed against the degree
of public harm. 421 Emergency measures may be taken when there are
extraordinary governmental needs where public security and safety are
422
imminently threatened.
The recent shooting and killing of a security guard at the Washington,
423
D.C. Holocaust museum by a lone gunman illustrates this problem.
The Holocaust museum is frequented by millions of visitors each year,
hundreds each day. 424 Visitors and their bags and containers are subject
to magnetometer searches, and armed security guards are stationed at the
public entrances. 425 Yet, a lone gunman was able to enter the building,
fire his weapon, kill a security guard, and threaten the safety of hundreds
of visitors. 426 At the time, there was no known general terrorist
threat. 427 It was later determined that the alleged gunman was a white
supremacist, with a history of anti-Semitic writings, who acted alone out
of personal hatred of Jews and blacks. 428 Further investigations revealed
that the gunman had visited public monuments, churches, and
synagogues as possible targets. 429 An increase of security at other
museums and public buildings in the Washington area followed the
shooting. 430 No one would suggest that security measures should not be
taken in such cases, which might include, for example, further pat-down
consensual searches.
Emergency public safety measures, such as
419. See supranotes 110-20 and accompanying text.
420. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
421. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
422. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44.
423. See Carrie Johnson & Spencer S. Hsu, Museum Suspect's Writings Had Not Triggered a Probe;
Case IllustratesFineLine for Law Officers, WASH. POST, June 12, 2009, at A4.
424. See Michael E. Ruane et al., At a Monument of Sorrow, a Burst of Deadly Violence; Guard
Killed, Suspect InjuredAmid Scene of Fear,Chaos, WASH. POST, June 11, 2009, at Al.
425. Jacqueline Trescott, Museums Reassess Security, WASH. POST, June 12, 2009, at C5.
426. See Ruane, supranote 424.
427. Alex Kingsburgy, Holocaust Museum Shooing, Other Recent Attacks Prove Domestic Extremism

a Threat,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 10, 2009.
428. See Johnson & Hsu, supranote 423.
429. See Bruce H. DeBoskey, FightBack Against Hate, DENY. POST, June 17, 2009, at B11.
430. See Johnson & Hsu, supranote 423.
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reasonable limited searches of all passengers and belongings entering
public buildings such as museums, are needed in cases like this.
As a case of domestic terrorism, although unaffiliated with a known
group, the question arose as to whether a prior criminal investigation
and surveillance was warranted of the suspect. 43 1 Surveillance of
personal communications must require a warrant, absent emergency
circumstances. There are no blanket war on terror measures which
justify warrantless searches of domestic communications. Although
officials were aware of the alleged holocaust shooter's hateful writings
against Jews and religious minorities, no criminal investigation had
begun. 432 As one official said, "law enforcement's challenge every day is
to balance the civil liberties of the United States citizen against the need
'433
to investigate activities that might lead to criminal conduct.
As the Keith Case demonstrated, a warrant is required for purely
domestic surveillance. 434 Although acts of domestic terrorism threaten
public safety and liberty as well as external terrorist threats, judicial
protection should be afforded to Fourth Amendment privacy interests.
Law enforcement profiles of terror suspects and investigations of
criminal behavior must conform to existing Fourth Amendment
protections without regard to the special needs doctrine. Physical
surveillance of possible criminal or terrorist activity, as well as private
email or internet communications, must conform to the reasonable
expectations of privacy protected by the Katz doctrine. 435 The Supreme
Court has recently reaffirmed Katz's holding that "'searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendmentsubject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.' ' 436 In Arizona v. Gant, the Court reaffirmed the privacy
interest people have in the contents of their cars by holding that police
may not search the vehicle following an arrest of an occupant unless it is
reasonable to believe that evidence of the arrest might be found in the
vehicle. 437 In Gant, the occupant was arrested for driving with a
suspended license, and it was unlikely that the police would find evidence
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in the passenger compartment of his car relating to the arrest. 438 In so
holding, the Court noted that a rule authorizing searches whenever a
traffic offense is committed creates a threat to the privacy of the
439
individuals.
Although Gant involved a search of a vehicle following an arrest, it is
uncertain whether other precedents will withstand the reasonable
expectation of privacy test. In Bond v. United States, the Court held
that a government agent's physical manipulation of a petitioner's bag
aboard a bus violated the Fourth Amendment. 440 The Court held that
passengers aboard buses have an expectation of privacy that their
carryon bags will not be manipulated in an exploratory manner, although
there is no privacy interest in bags being moved or touched aboard a bus
by bus employees or other passengers. 441 The inquiry under Katz asks
whether an individual's privacy interest is one that society regards as
reasonable. 442 Bond was a pre-9/1 1 case before the special needs
doctrine was expanded to allow container and bag searches on public
subways. 443 It is unclear if tactile manipulation of a bag on a public bus
or train, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, would now be an
444
objectively reasonable search under the special needs exception.
However, the MacWade decision upheld such searches on a random basis
in response to an alleged terrorist threat. 445 The court's balancing
analysis weighed in favor of the government's demonstrated need,
broadened the special needs doctrine, and diminished the expectation of
446
privacy in such warrantless physical searches.
Expansion of warrantless searches in combating domestic or foreign
threats under the special needs exception undermines Fourth
Amendment privacy interests. Although privacy expectations have
reduced in response to perceived threats to domestic security, absent
evidence of domestic or foreign threats to national security which
438. Id.at 1714, 1719.
439. Id. at 1720.
440. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 334 (2000).
441. Id. at 338-39.
442. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
443. See Bond, 529 U.S. at 334.
444. What if the shooter in the Holocaust Museum killing had used a public bus and was subjected to
an exterior search of a bag, which when manipulated indicated the presence of a rifle? What if it
further indicated explosive devices which were not discoverable absent a search? A search of all
bags aboard buses would violate the Fourth Amendment absent an emergency exception involving a
threat to public safety. See id. at 338-39. But manipulation of luggage is now common place for
entrances in public buildings and sporting events. See supranotes 395-404 and accompanying text.
445. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 275 (2d Cir. 2006).
446. See supraPart III.F.
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warrant extraordinary measures, the warrant requirement is still valid
under the Fourth Amendment.
There is no mass transportation
exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Technological surveillance, data mining, cell phone tracking devices,
and other forms of information gathering by the government continue
to threaten liberty and privacy interests. The expansion of the special
needs category, which now includes DNA testing of persons arrested for
crimes, has further diminished expectations of Privacy. 447
The
investigatory net has widened in response to the government's need to
combat crime and terrorism in the present times. As the need for
government searches has grown, reasonable expectations of privacy
have fluctuated as well. 448 Courts should continue to provide Fourth
Amendment warrant limitations on the government's ability to
broadened searches for national security purposes absent extraordinary
government circumstances.
Absent evidence of extraordinary
government circumstances, such as an immediate imminent threat to
public safety, the Katz test should govern government searches, including
physical searches and electronic information gathering from the privacy
of the home, which impact Fourth Amendment privacy interests. As
Justice Brennan responded to the first special needs case, "only where
there is some extraordinary governmental interest involved-is it
legitimate to engage in a balancing test to determine whether a warrant
449
is indeed necessary."
VI. CONCLUSION

This article has shown that the expansion of physical searches under
the special needs exceptions and the warrantless searches of personal
communications in the name of national security will erode Fourth
Amendment privacy interests unless proper safeguards are observed to
protect society's reasonable expectation of privacy and liberty interests
from unwarranted government intrusion. Those privacy expectations
are grounded in the very structure of the Fourth Amendment which has

447. See, e.g., Aaron B. Chapin, Note, Arresting DNA: Privacy Expectations of Free Citizens Versus
Post-Convicted Persons and the Unconstitutionality of DNA Dragnets, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1842, 1864
(2005) ("The 'special needs' doctrine has been used to justify warrantless, suspicionless searches in
various contexts, including compelled DNA collections from post-convicted persons.").
448. See Stuntz, supranote 10, at 2142.
449. New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U.S. 325, 357 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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not changed.450 Extraordinary circumstances such as massive terrorist
threats in domestic security matters must be weighed against a
heightened level of privacy to justify warrantless searches. 45 1 The
warrant clause itself stands as the final bulwark against enhanced
intrusions which are at today's virtual doorstep.

450. See id.
451. Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11+ 311 + 71 ? What Counts in Counterterrorism, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTs.
L. REV. 559, 563 (2006) (discussing the notion of mass terrorism as opposed to smaller scale attacks,
our collective responses to such attacks, and how our behavior can influence and shape our
counterterrorism policy).

